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INTRODUCTION 
or at least half a century, the legal system in the United States has 
extended many protections to organizations that provide 
information about the activities of businesses and other issues of 
public concern. The most recognizable organizations that have 
historically played that role are traditional media organizations, in 
particular radio, television, newspaper, and magazine outlets.1 From a 
standpoint of legal protection, professional reviewers of business 
products and services generally fall within this traditional media 
group.2 However, there are many new players in the digital era 
challenging the role of traditional media, such as social media 
websites. Facebook, for instance, recently announced in January 2017 
the Facebook Journalism Project to emphasize its news operations 
and to address skepticism about its journalistic commitment.3 
A great variety of organizations assist consumers with obtaining 
information on a business’s products and services. That mix includes 
numerous governmental agencies, nonprofit companies such as the 
Better Business Bureau (BBB) organizations, and for-profit 
companies such as private media. The information these organizations 
provide ultimately saves consumers many headaches because 
frequently consumers face great difficulty obtaining effective recourse 
 
1 See Rebecca Phillips, Comment, Constitutional Protection for Nonmedia Defendants: 
Should There Be a Distinction Between You and Larry King?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 173, 
185–86 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 487–90, 498–501 
(1984). 
3 Brian Stelter, Facebook Unveils ‘Facebook Journalism Project,’ CNNMONEY (Jan. 
11, 2017, 10:07 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/11/media/facebook-journalism-proj 
ect/index.html?iid=hp-stack-dom. 
F
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against a business who has wronged that consumer.4 Avoiding the 
encounter with the problematic business in the first place will 
generally be the easier and cheaper option for the consumer.5 On the 
governmental side, attorney generals, state agencies, and federal 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission play a significant role 
in alerting the public to unlawful and deceptive business activities.6 In 
addition to pursuing legal action against businesses, these 
governmental bodies frequently publish guidance for consumers 
about business activities deemed harmful or risky to consumers.7 
While the liability scheme for governmental organizations 
commenting on business products and services is beyond the scope of 
this Article, generally speaking, they have sovereign immunity from 
defamation and similar claims.8 
However, as with any situation, there are limits on what 
governmental organizations and the traditional media—such as 
professional reviewers—can do about a problem. Since the early 
1900s, BBB organizations have played a large role in providing 
information to consumers about questionable business practices.9 In 
their modern form, BBB organizations provide access online to 
significant information about businesses to help consumers make 
educated decisions about choosing to do business with a company.10 
The massive consumer use of the Internet has also opened entirely 
new platforms for different players to step into this consumer 
protection gap, in particular nontraditional media organizations, social 
media, and crowdsourced consumer review sites. On crowdsourced 
consumer review sites—such as Google, Yelp, TripAdvisor, and 
 
4 See, e.g., Fred Galves, Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-
Commerce Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient, and Secure, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 nn.12–13 (2009); Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the 
Digital Age: Empowering Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 
200–02 (2010). 
5 See Galves, supra note 4; Schmitz, supra note 4. 
6 See infra Part IV(A). 
7 See, e.g., Kristy Holtfreter et al., Consumer Fraud Victimization in Florida: An 
Empirical Study, 18 SAINT THOMAS L. REV. 761, 764–65 (2006); Ralph E. Stone, The 
Federal Trade Commission and Timeshare Resale Companies, 24 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 49, 
68–69 (1990). 
8 Kaiser v. Blue Cross of Cal., 347 F.3d 1107, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). Likewise, in the 
context of constitutional claims against state actors, they cannot be liable for damages to 
reputation alone. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–12 (1976). 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 303–310. 
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Angie’s List—anyone can express their experiences with a given 
business.11 Hundreds of millions of users take advantage of these 
platforms every month, with some data indicating that over eighty 
percent of consumers now read reviews for businesses and products 
online.12 The level of consumer power to express dissatisfaction with 
a business or product has never been greater. Anyone with an internet 
connection can post a negative review online or on a company’s 
social media page.13 
Understandably, given the highly varied nature of these 
organizations providing information on business products and 
services, the legal framework governing liability for their activities is 
equally diverse. More particularly, it is an unusual mix of common 
law, constitutional restrictions, and statutory protections. This liability 
system—especially the protections available to these entities—will be 
the focus of the Article.14 This Article will focus on how the mass use 
of digital platforms to access information, including about business 
products and services, has challenged the legal system to keep up with 
these technological changes. 
 
11 Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer “Gag” 
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
59, 62–63 (2016). 
12 See id. at 62–63 nn.5–7 (providing recent usage data for Yelp, TripAdvisor, and 
Angie’s List); Jayson DeMers, How Important Are Customer Reviews for Online 
Marketing?, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2015, 3:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayson 
demers/2015/12/28/how-important-are-customer-reviews-for-online-marketing/#78895a7b 
788c. 
13 See, e.g., Bedford v. Spassoff, 485 S.W.3d 641, 651–52 (Tex. App. 2016); THE 
DELOITTE CONSUMER REVIEW: THE GROWING POWER OF CONSUMERS, DELOITTE 2–3, 
13 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/consumer-busi 
ness/consumer-review-8-the-growing-power-of-consumers.pdf; DeMers, supra note 12. 
14 One important source of protection for these entities that is nonuniform among states 
and thus not conducive to substantial coverage in this Article is anti-SLAPP statutes. See 
Carson Hilary Barylak, Note, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 845, 869–72 (2010). In approximately ten states, defendants can invoke the 
procedures under these statutes typically through a motion to dismiss to defeat a lawsuit 
involving exercise of speech rights on a matter of public concern—such as complaints 
about products and services. See, e.g., Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Hous., Inc. v. John 
Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 353 (Tex. App. 2013) (discussing dismissal 
procedures under Texas’s anti-SLAAP statute and recognizing that coverage of matters of 
public concern under statute includes “a good, product, or service in the marketplace”); 
supra, at 845–48, 869–72; Shannon Hartzler, Note, Protecting Informed Public 
Participation: Anti-SLAPP Law and the Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U.L. REV. 1235, 
1237–38, 1252–70 (2007) (“However, comparatively few states have passed anti-SLAPP 
legislation that protects broader First Amendment interests such as freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press.”). 
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Part I of this Article will discuss the changing face of the news 
media in the digital age and the resulting financial pressure on 
traditional media organizations, particularly local news organizations. 
Part II of this Article will cover the common law defamation system 
that still largely governs the liability system for defendants in this 
area. Part III of this Article will examine the constitutional protections 
in place for entities commenting on business products and services, 
including several unresolved issues affecting this liability system. Part 
IV of this Article will explore the history of BBB organizations in 
their consumer-protection function and the corresponding legal 
privilege courts have recognized for BBB entities, a privilege largely 
unaddressed by legal scholarship. Part V of this Article will address 
the Communications Decency Act, a critical protection in the digital 
age for defamation and related claims, that applies to websites that 
host statements from third parties, most notably consumers. Part VI 
will emphasize the continued importance of enforcing and expanding 
these protections for entities that comment on business products and 
services. 
I 
THE INCREASINGLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS TO 
TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
News consumption has changed forever with the consumer 
transition to digital platforms (e.g., computers, smartphones, and 
tablets) away from traditional media platforms such as print and 
television. One of the only phenomena that can rival the dramatic 
impact digital platforms have had on the news media is the striking 
pace at which the transition to digital platforms has taken place. When 
compared to the telephone, which took over seventy years to reach 
ninety percent of homes and businesses, the adoption of new 
technologies like smartphones and tablets dwarfs that of their 
predecessors.15 
Technology adoption rates certainly increased as the twentieth 
century progressed. Radio and television, for example, encountered 
 
15 See Mark Bauerlein, Introduction to STEVEN JOHNSON ET AL., THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 
ix–x (Mark Bauerlein ed., 2011); Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster 
Than Any Technology in Human History?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), https://www 
.technologyreview.com/s/427787/are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology 
-in-human-history/. 
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much swifter adoption rates than electricity and the telephone.16 The 
adoption rate of smartphones was an impressive forty percent United 
States market penetration in roughly ten years after their introduction 
in the early 2000s, a benchmark that took computers over twenty 
years to reach.17 While even computers themselves took roughly 
thirty-five years to reach seventy-five percent market share, United 
States consumer usage of smartphones in the United States was over 
seventy percent as of early 2015.18 For traditional media institutions, 
a big concern is that advertiser interest has also followed the 
consumer interest in these platforms.19 To the detriment of print, 
radio, and broadcast media, those advertisers use those very same 
digital innovations, challenging traditional media to more specifically 
target their audience.20 
These dramatic changes were, in many ways, possible because of 
high internet usage rates, the growth of which snowballed in the 
1990s. Census data show growth in internet access rates in 
households of 18.0% in 1997, 54.7% in 2003, and 71.7% in 2011.21 
New mediums where consumers can access news, like social media 
networks, have also grown exponentially with Facebook growing 
from a one-college social network to a titan with 500 million users in 
just six years.22 The online, crowdsourced encyclopedia Wikipedia 
started in 2001 but has now grown to over five million English 
language articles.23 Essentially feeding its own growth, the mass 
 
16 See DeGusta supra note 15. 
17 Id. 
18 Jacob Poushter, Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in 
Emerging Economies, 16 (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smart 
phone-ownership-and-internet-usage-continues-to-climb-in-emerging-economies/. 
19 Des Freedman, The Political Economy of the ‘New’ News Environment, in NEW 
MEDIA, OLD NEWS: JOURNALISM & DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 35 (Natalie 
Fenton ed., 2010) [hereinafter NEW MEDIA] (“They are in danger because younger 
audiences are deserting them for the immediacy and interactivity of the internet, because 
advertisers are increasingly attracted by the possibilities of more accurately targeting 
audiences online . . . .”). 
20 See id. 
21 See THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1–2 (2013), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publi 
cations/2013/demo/p20-569.pdf. 
22 Bauerlein, supra note 15. As of the end of 2016, Facebook had 1.86 billion users. See 
Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Revenue Jumps Again, Buoyed by Mobile Advertising, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2017, 7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-revenue       
-jumps-again-1485983393. 
23 Bauerlein, supra note 15, at x; Katherine Mangu-Ward, Wikipedia and Beyond: 
Jimmy Wales’ Sprawling Vision, REASON (June 2007), http://reason.com/archives/2007 
/05/30/wikipedia-and-beyond; Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of Wikipedia, TIME (Aug. 18, 
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availability of internet access has allowed content on digital platforms 
to flourish. 
A. The Changing Face of the News “Media” 
It is no overstatement that the dramatic growth of digital platforms 
and digital content has rocked traditional news organizations—
especially print organizations—to their core.24 This digital 
transformation has challenged “everything from basic economic 
models to the very definition of journalist and audience.”25 The 
barrier between a news organization and an individual has never been 
lower.26 Traditional media organizations have faced unprecedented 
financial pressure from their digital counterparts, which can operate in 
a highly decentralized manner and generally at lower cost.27 
Even before digital media stole enormous market share for news 
coverage, dramatic consolidation of traditional media outlets had 
already begun. In 1995, 129 newspaper owners owned eighty percent 
of American newspapers.28 As the twentieth century came to a 
conclusion, publicly traded companies absorbed many newspapers, 
which ultimately subjected the papers to greater scrutiny for 
accounting cuts in hard times in spite of their many journalistic 
accomplishments.29 In 2007, after the family who owned the Wall 
Street Journal sold the paper, few major newspaper organizations 
were majority owned by anyone family, with the Washington Post 
 
2009), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1917002,00.html; James 
Titcomb, Wikipedia’s 5 Million Articles Still Cover Less than 5 Per Cent of All Human 
Knowledge, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2015, 10:02 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/technology/wikipedia/11969459/Wikipedias-5-million-articles-still-cover-less-than-5-per 
-cent-of-all-human-knowledge.html. 
24 See EDGAR SIMPSON, NEWS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN A 
DIGITAL NATION: RISE OF THE AUDIENCE 8–10 (2016) (reprt. ed. 2016). 
25 Id. at 9. 
26 See id. at 8–10. 
27 Natalie Fenton, Drowning or Waving? New Media, Journalism and Democracy, in 
NEW MEDIA, supra note 19, at 3, 8–9; infra text accompanying notes 33–39 and 97–101. 
28 Kristian D. Whitten, The Economics of Actual Malice: A Proposal for Legislative 
Changes to the Rule of New York Times v. Sullivan, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 519, 553 (2001). 
29 PHILIP MEYER, THE VANISHING NEWSPAPER: SAVING JOURNALISM IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 168–75, 182–85 (2d ed. 2009) (“A newspaper might win Pulitzer 
prizes, have an appealing design, and serve as watchdog and guardian of its community, 
but all accountants look at is the nominal value of the money it makes.”). 
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and The New York Times remaining as holdouts.30 That consolidation 
trend continues to the present day with even larger news 
organizations, like Gannett which publishes USA Today, aggressively 
acquiring other newspapers to maintain market strength.31 Many 
newspapers have felt the pressure to merge for survival or else face 
closure.32 
For a historical perspective, newspaper circulation in the United 
States reached its peak in 1989 and then began to drop from that peak 
approximately three to four percentage points per year during the 
1990s.33 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, newspapers 
further lost twenty-five percent of their subscribers and thirty percent 
of their editorial capacity.34 In 2006, daily newspaper readership 
dropped below fifty percent for the first time.35 In 2007, weekday 
circulation of daily newspapers in the United States fell to 50.7 
million, the lowest point since 1945.36 In that same year, Sunday 
papers—which serve an important role for advertisers placing ad 
inserts in paper circulation—dropped to levels not seen since 1972.37 
Daily circulation fell from 62.3 million in 1990 to 43.4 million in 
2010, representing a roughly thirty percent decline.38 Hundreds of 
 
30 Rodney Benson, Futures of the News: International Considerations and Further 
Reflections, in NEW MEDIA, supra note 19, at 196. 
31 See Mathew Ingram, Gannett Tries to Ride the Newspaper Consolidation Wave with 
Tribune Bid, FORTUNE (Apr. 25, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/25/gannett-tribune/. 
32 Michael Barthel, Newspaper: Fact Sheet, in PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE STATE OF 
THE NEWS MEDIA 2016 9, 18–19 (2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads 
/sites/13/2016/06/30143308/state-of-the-news-media-report-2016-final.pdf (discussing 
recent consolidation in 2015–16 timeframe). 
33 SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 9. Newspaper readership was consistently high before 
1989, for instance with eighty percent of adults reading the newspaper on a typical 
weekday in 1961. See MEYER, supra note 29, at 121. 
34 BILL KOVARIK, REVOLUTIONS IN COMMUNICATION: MEDIA HISTORY FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE DIGITAL AGE 101 (2011); see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE STATE 
OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2010 (2010), http://assets.pewresearch.org.s3.amazonaws.com 
/files/journalism/State-of-the-News-Media-Report-2010-FINAL.pdf/ (last visited Sept. 14, 
2017) [hereinafter STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2010]. 
35 MEYER, supra note 29, at 2. Advertisers heavily rely upon this metric in making ad 
placement decisions. See id. 
36 Id. at 1. 
37 Id. 
38 Rick Edmonds et al., Newspapers: Building Digital Revenues Proves Painfully Slow, 
in PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2012 11 (2012), http://assets 
.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2017/05/24141622/State-of-the-News-
Media-Report-2012-FINAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
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newspapers have filed for bankruptcy in recent decades while tens of 
thousands of newspaper employees have lost their jobs.39 
The Great Recession, which hit its peak in 2008 and 2009, did 
nothing to help the ailing newspaper industry.40 The challenges of a 
severe economic recession presented an unwelcome surprise to 
newspapers already fending off digital competition.41 Many are 
rightfully concerned that accountants are now calling the shots for 
newspapers, forcing cost-cutting measures that may accelerate the 
pace at which newspapers become obsolete.42 The very journalism 
institutions that pride themselves on quality are asking their staff to 
produce significantly more news in the face of major cost 
reductions.43 
Many have recognized that “[t]he loss of newspapers . . . translates 
to a disproportionately high loss of journalism.”44 Newspaper 
journalists have long served as one of the most important watchdogs 
of our governmental institutions and private-sector businesses.45 With 
their financial and talent resources, newspapers have broken countless 
stories that have changed the path of an entire country. The 
Washington Post, for example, exposed the Watergate scandal.46 For 
more recent examples, journalists covering the Trump administration 
were crucial in breaking the story on (1) former National Security 
 
39 See Barthel, supra note 32, at 9, 18–19; Stephanie Chen, Newspapers Fold as 
Readers Defect and Economy Sours, CNN (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009 
/US/03/19/newspaper.decline.layoff/index.html?_s=PM:US. The USA Today, for instance, 
laid off ten percent of its staff around the time of the Great Recession. See MEYER, supra 
note 29, at 2. 
40 See MEYER, supra note 29, at 1–2. 
41 See id. at 188. 
42 See id. at 2–3, 10–11 (“As this is written, the accountants appear to be guiding the 
transformation without much thought about the end product. If they continue to slash and 
burn their existing businesses, all they will end up with are slashed, burned, obsolete 
businesses.”). 
43 Freedman, supra note 19, at 41. 
44 MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., OLD MEDIA, NEW MEDIA AND THE 
CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 26 (2010), http://web1.millercenter.org 
/publications/mediagovt.pdf; accord KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 75–76, 101; MEYER, 
supra note 29, at 10. 
45 See Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Introduction: The Uncertain Future of Local Journalism, 
in LOCAL JOURNALISM: THE DECLINE OF NEWSPAPERS AND THE RISE OF DIGITAL MEDIA 
9–10 (Rasmus Kleis Nielsen ed., 2015); MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF VA., 
supra note 44, at 39–40. 
46 KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 95. 
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Advisor Michael Flynn’s potentially improper contacts with Russia,47 
and (2) former FBI Director James Comey’s memoranda 
documenting President’s Trump’s conduct that some argue amounts 
to obstruction of justice in connection with the Flynn investigation.48 
However, investigative journalism has suffered because of increasing 
pressure on journalists to never leave the newsroom, given the easy 
availability of information online about the very news events on 
which they are reporting.49 
While television is still the most popular source where adults in the 
United States primarily obtain their news,50 it is hard to ignore that 
the Internet will soon become the most prominent source of news in 
the United States and eventually the rest of the world.51 In 2008, more 
U.S. adults obtained their news from the web than from newspapers.52 
The Pew Research Center conducted a survey in 2016 in which U.S. 
adults expressed that they received news “often” from any of the 
following sources: (1) fifty-seven percent−Television, (2) thirty-eight 
percent−Online, (3) twenty-five percent−Radio, and (4) twenty 
percent−Print Newspapers.53 Fortunately for traditional media 
organizations, just over a third of digital news consumers surveyed in 
2016 actually preferred the Internet as their primary platform for 
news.54 However, it is a stark reality for newspapers that they are 
losing their relevance to most Americans.55 
 
47 Philip Bump, The Fall of Michael Flynn: A Timeline, WASH. POST (updated May 17, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/02/14/the-fall-of-michael 
-flynn-a-timeline/?utm_term=.dedbd0560b31. 
48 See Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Appealed to Comey to Halt Inquiry Into Aide, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 2017, at A1. 
49 Fenton, supra note 27, at 3, 7–8 (“An intensification of pressure in the newsroom to 
produce articles in less time is claimed to have led to fewer journalists gathering 
information outside of the newsroom.”). 
50 AMY MITCHELL ET AL., THE MODERN NEWS CONSUMER 5 (2016), http://www 
.journalism.org/2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/. 
51 See Phillips, supra note 1, at 188. 
52 News Release, Pew Research Ctr., Internet Overtakes Newspapers as News Outlet 1–
2 (Dec. 23, 2008), http://people-press.org/report/479/internet-overtakes-newspapers-as      
-news-outlet. 
53 MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 5. 
54 See id. 
55 Chen, supra note 39 (describing the grim situation for newspapers and explaining 
that “newspapers are losing their relevance in the lives of a majority of Americans, 
particularly younger readers”). 
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Notably, in 1996, only twelve percent of adults in the United States 
obtained news online.56 In 2016, that percentage rose to eighty-one 
percent.57 Additionally, seventy-two percent of U.S. adults in 2016 
received news on a mobile device.58 Social media platforms like 
Facebook and Instagram have also become a powerful news source, 
with sixty-two percent of adults obtaining news through social media 
and a staggering eighty-four percent of adults between eighteen and 
twenty-nine years old doing so.59 These trends among younger news 
consumers should particularly concern traditional media institutions. 
Some have partially attributed the challenges print media have 
faced to their own complacency.60 In spite of the dramatic 
transformations digital platforms foretold, which many print 
publishers could see coming, print publishers as a whole did relatively 
little to adapt to these changes until it was too late.61 The desire to 
avoid cutting into existing profits contributed to this lack of action.62 
In fairness to newspapers, many of them have made significant 
investments in developing their online presence.63 However, some 
scholars have observed that newspapers, in an uninspired way, 
“sought to invent the [w]eb in their own image by repurposing the 
copy, values, and temperament found in their ink-and-paper 
editions.”64 
Implementing pay walls for content exemplifies the struggle many 
print media organizations face. The vast amount of free content online 
has created incredible hurdles to convincing consumers to pay for 
content simply because it comes from a traditional print media 
 
56 See Amy Mitchell, Key Findings on the Traits and Habits of the Modern News 





60 KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 70. 
61 See id. at 103 (“The best that can be said of the publishing industry’s response to the 
digital revolution is that some organizations made a very modest attempt to meet the 
challenge. Although many saw it coming, only a few did anything to retool and adapt the 
industry, since that would mean cutting into profits.”). 
62 See id. 
63 Jack Shafer, Newspaper Death Foretold by Warren Buffett!!!, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2009, 
7:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2217014/. 
64 Jack Shafer, How Newspapers Tried to Invent the Web but Failed, SLATE (Jan. 6, 
2009, 12:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2009/01 
/how_newspapers_tried_to_invent_the_web.html. 
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institution.65 Many online users show a heavy reluctance to paying for 
news content.66 However, various newspapers have successfully 
implemented pay walls, which will help them survive as the shift to 
digital platforms continues.67 One consistent trend for newspapers is 
to provide a metered plan where readers can view a limited number of 
free articles before paying anything.68 This intermediate technique 
helps a site keep traffic from searches, links to the articles, and social 
media references.69 Data from summer 2015 indicate that local 
newspapers have been more aggressive in launching some form of 
pay wall while larger circulation newspapers have done so less 
frequently.70 
There is a good argument that digital platforms simply present a 
unique threat that no prior competitors to newspapers could mount. 
From the 1920s forward, radio certainly presented a challenge to 
newspapers—including for advertising revenue—but never actually 
stopped the growth of newspaper circulation.71 Print media had a near 
monopoly on news until it faced meaningful challenge from 
television, radio, and ultimately digital platforms.72 Even in the face 
of strong non-digital competitors like radio and television, 
newspapers had high profit margins in the 25%–40% range compared 
to the average retail business in the twentieth century that survived on 
 
65 See Freedman, supra note 19, at 44 (“The central economic fact about online news is 
that users have shown a marked reluctance to pay for news content, partly because of a 
residual belief that all generalist online content should be free.”); STATE OF THE NEWS 
MEDIA 2010, supra note 34. 
66 See Freedman, supra note 19, at 44; STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2010, supra note 
34. 
67 Edmonds et al., supra note 38. 
68 See id.; Alex T. Williams, How Digital Subscriptions Work at Newspapers Today, 
AM. PRESSINST. (Feb. 29, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanpressinstitute.org 
/publications/reports/digital-subscriptions-today/. These metered plans are also referred to 
as “freemium” plans. Id. 
69 See Edmonds et al., supra note 38. 
70 Williams, supra note 68 (“Anecdotally, it has been noted that local newspapers may 
be best positioned to require digital subscriptions. Our data supports this, as 86% of 
newspapers with circulations between 50,000 to 100,000 have launched digital 
subscriptions, the highest percentage. . . . At the other end of the spectrum, newspapers 
with a circulation size over 250,000 are least likely to use a subscription model, with 64% 
doing so.”). 
71 See KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 222, 231–32. 
72 See id.; MEYER, supra note 29, at 13; Eric Alterman, Out of Print: The Death and 
Life of the American Newspaper, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 30, 2008), https://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2008/03/31/out-of-print. 
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single-digit profit margins.73 Even in 2007, those margins were still 
close to twenty-five percent for newspapers.74 While means of 
instantaneous communication such as telegraphs and telephones 
presented significant challenges to print media, those technological 
developments in many ways bolstered profit margins.75 A 
sophisticated news organization could harness those resources to 
generate content unlike an individual.76 Compared to television and 
radio, print media in particular has shown its age because it is 
“tethered to 20th-century industrial processes such as massive 
printing presses, tons of paper, and fleets of delivery trucks.”77 
While broadcast news on television has not suffered as extensively 
as print media,78 television news programming has faced many of its 
own challenges from digital platforms. Television news, just like 
newspapers, has competed with digital platforms for an audience 
share which has led to declining profits.79 While local and cable 
television long monopolized the living room, viewers are increasingly 
shifting their video consumption to streaming services available 
through digital platforms such as YouTube, Netflix, and Amazon 
Video.80 At the very least, for news organizations willing to make the 
investment in digital resources, it is certainly possible to translate 
digital news content to the web, although this process is disruptive to 
a traditional television advertising model.81 
 
73 MEYER, supra note 29, at 39 (“Supermarkets can prosper with a margin of 1 to 2 
percent because their buyers consume the products continually and have to keep coming 
back. Sellers of diamonds or yachts or luxury sedans build much higher margins into their 
prices to compensate for less frequent sales. Across the whole range of retail products, the 
average profit margin is in the neighborhood of 6 to 7 percent.”). 
74 See id. 
75 See SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 8–10. 
76 See id. 
77 Dan Kennedy, Print Is Dying, Digital Is No Savior: The Long, Ugly Decline Of The 
Newspaper Business Continues Apace, WGBH NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://news.wgbh 
.org/2016/01/26/local-news/print-dying-digital-no-savior-long-ugly-decline-newspaper      
-business-continues; accord Freedman, supra note 19, at 36. 
78 See, e.g., MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 4–5. 
79 KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 262; Daniel Schiffman, How TV Can Succeed in the 
Digital Age, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing 
/2016/01/19/how-tv-can-succeed-in-the-digital-age/#56f369d2aed8. 
80 See Pew Study: More Viewers Choose YouTube for Breaking News, PBS NEWSHOUR 
(July 16, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media-july-dec12-pewyou 
tube_07-16/; Schiffman, supra note 79. 
81 See Christopher Williams, How Young Viewers Are Abandoning Television, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 8, 2014, 12:54 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector 
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One of the most interesting phenomena arising from the transition 
to digital platforms is the pace at which news can spread. Now, a 
relatively small story can gain national attention in the span of a few 
hours.82 While twenty-four-hour news channels broke down the wall 
of instantaneous coverage of developing issues, the Internet permits 
people to follow developments on countless stories on a minute-by-
minute basis.83 Furthermore, viewers can actively participate in that 
story by commenting on it, reposting it, or modifying it.84 With free 
programs that often require little more than a basic familiarity with 
technology, a viewer can do anything from republish a story to 
another’s social media page to create their own musical parody of a 
popular video.85 The ease of entry to these platforms, compared to 
something costly and cumbersome like a printing press, has 
decentralized the publication process to an astonishing degree.86 
B. The Consequences for Local Media Organizations 
What is sometimes lost in the shuffle when discussing the 
transition to digital news platforms is the effect on local news 
organizations. Importantly, local journalism still accounts for the 
majority of the content that the journalistic profession generates.87 
Local news organizations play a key role in the frontline for news for 
consumers, including alerting them to notable business activities in 
their local economy and educating them about local consumer 




82 Bauerlein, supra note 15, at vii–viii (“By comparison, today’s communication travels 
at light speed, and any edgy, comic, or otherwise quirky story or video can ‘go viral.’”). 
83 See SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 1–2; David Folkenflik, The Power of the 24-Hour 
News Cycle, NPR (May 29, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story 
.php?storyId=4671485. 
84 Bauerlein, supra note 15, at viii. 
85 See id. at viii–ix. 
86 See id. at ix. 
87 See Nielsen, supra note 45, at 2. 
88 See Justin Brown, Digital Must-Carry & the Case for Public Television, 15 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 84 (2005); Andrew D. Cotlar, The Road not yet Traveled: 
Why the FCC Should Issue Digital Must-Carry Rules for Public Television “First,” 57 
FED. COMM. L.J. 49, 54–55 (2004); Roscoe B. Starek, III, Former Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, The Consumer Protection Pyramid: Education, Self-Regulation, and Law 
Enforcement, Address at the 1997 Korea Consumer Festival (Dec. 2, 1997), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1997/12/consumer-protection-pyramid-education    
-self-regulation-law-enforcement (discussing role of local news organizations in 
disseminating information on fraudulent scholarship practices). 
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circulation areas, facing limited competition from regional and 
national media.89 Newspapers first began reaching mass audiences 
around the 1820s.90 While the challenge of competition from 
television broadcasters that began in the 1950s presented a serious 
threat to newspapers, the Internet has threatened their very survival.91 
By the 1970s, consolidation pressures left many markets with only 
one newspaper.92 
Newspaper operations of all sizes have struggled to make their 
online platforms profitable because online growth has simply not 
replaced the financial damage from the drop in print circulation.93 In 
2010, print losses for advertising compared to digital gains for 
advertising were an unhealthy seven to one ratio, while that same 
ratio widened to ten to one in 2011.94 While those dramatic drops 
have leveled out to some degree, it is telling that in 2014, the 
Newspaper Association of America simply stopped releasing 
industry-wide revenue data.95 
Managing this transition is painful for news organizations but can 
be less damaging if they continue to find creative ways to engage 
their audience online, which will help attract more advertising 
revenue.96 The rules of the advertising game have changed with the 
dominating presence of internet searches in generating advertising 
revenue and the increasing growth of social media advertising.97 
Social media advertising in the United States in 2015 grew fifty-five 
percent from $7 billion the year before to $10.9 billion.98 Mobile 
platforms now drive digital ad growth which climbed to $20.7 billion 
 
89 See Nielsen, supra note 45, at 6. 
90 SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 2. 
91 See KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 75, 236. 
92 See id. at 75. 
93 Nielsen, supra note 45, at 3. 
94 See Edmonds et al., supra note 38. Specifically, online advertising was up $207 
million industry-wide compared to 2010 while print advertising was down $2.1 billion. Id. 
95 Barthel, supra note 32, at 13–14. 
96 See Freedman, supra note 19, at 43 (“The internet therefore provides news 
organizations with a wonderful opportunity to engage new audiences in the hope that they 
may somehow compensate for declining ratings and advertising.”). 
97 See id. at 45; Dan Frommer, Google has Run Away with the Web Search Market and 
Almost No One is Chasing, QUARTZ (July 25, 2014), https://qz.com/239332/google-has      
-run-away-with-the-web-search-market-and-almost-no-one-is-chasing/. 
98 George Slefo, Digital Ad Spending Surges to Record High as Mobile and Social 
Grow More than 50%, ADAGE (Apr. 21, 2016), http://adage.com/article/digital/iab-digital 
-advertising-generated-60-billion-2016/303650/. 
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in 2015, a sixty-six percent increase from the previous year.99 
Projections for 2016 even indicate that digital advertising will surpass 
television advertising in revenue.100 In particular, in the United States 
digital ad spending will likely reach $72.09 billion with 36.8% of 
total media ad spending, while TV spending will likely grow to 
$71.29 billion with 36.4% of total media ad spending.101 However, 
these shifts do create some opportunities for local organizations to 
grab some of that market share.102 
With the ease of access to comparable resources online, local and 
regional newspapers now struggle to maintain historically important 
revenue bases such as classified ads where online competitors are 
already dominating that market.103 In the first decade of the twenty-
first century, newspapers lost approximately half of their advertising 
revenue, which has dramatic implications for those institutions.104 
The fickle support of advertisers has caused many news organizations 
to experiment with new options such as greater reliance on citizen 
donations and foundation grants.105 The logic for such changes is that 
reliance on other sponsors could be no worse than relying on disloyal 
advertisers.106 Nonprofit models present significant potential for news 
organizations that do not want to make further sacrifices to owners 
and advertisers.107 
Many staple newspapers with a larger footprint have taken creative 
steps to adapt. Overreliance on advertising as a source of revenue—
eighty-two percent of newspaper revenue in 2000—tied newspapers’ 
fate to the whims of those advertisers.108 Newspapers have 
fortunately begun harvesting the benefits of replacement revenue 
sources such as online classifieds.109 Traditional media organizations 
have also, through acquisitions or strategic partnerships, leveraged 
distribution of branded content through multiple platforms, both print 
 
99 See id. 
100 US Digital Ad Spending to Surpass TV this Year, EMARKETER, https://www 
.emarketer.com/Article/US-Digital-Ad-Spending-Surpass-TV-this-Year/1014469 (last 
visited Sept 15, 2017). 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 Nielsen, supra note 45, at 6, 104. 
104 See KOVARIK, supra note 34. 
105 MEYER, supra note 29, at 208–10. 
106 See id. 
107 See Freedman, supra note 19, at 196–99. 
108 MEYER, supra note 29, at 40–41, 122. 
109 See Freedman, supra note 19, at 42. 
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and digital.110 Some new- and old-media organizations have also 
partnered with their advertisers to produce “native advertising” by 
using the organization’s resources to prepare content that appears like 
an article but is, in many ways, an advertisement.111 Many other 
organizations have relied on their non-journalism skills for 
replacement revenue. For instance, the Dallas Morning News 
increased its commercial printing and commercial distribution for 
third parties, which made up ten percent of the paper’s revenue in 
2011.112 
Radio news organizations, in comparison, have encountered less 
trouble adapting to challenges from digital platforms.113 Notably, talk 
radio programming on AM and FM stations actually grew from 
approximately 400 such stations in 1990 to 3000 in the year 2010.114 
Radio news organizations have also more seamlessly incorporated 
satellite radio and digital platforms into their existing business 
models.115 Radio has the benefit of not requiring cable infrastructure 
like cable television channels, which helped it maintain an adaptable 
market position.116 However, in the long run, local radio news faces 
significant economic headwinds.117 
The power of a community working together through 
crowdsourcing or other digital platforms also opens many doors for 
local media.118 As the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
recognized in 2011, “independent non-profit websites are providing 
exciting journalistic innovation on the local level” because of the 
 
110 See id. at 42–44. 
111 Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 655–60 (2015). Understandably, this blurring of lines between 
advertising and editorial content presents risks of misleading customers and additional 
liability potential for the involved media organization. See id. at 662–77. 
112 News & Tech Staff, One on One – Jim Moroney, A.H. Belo Corp., NEWS & TECH 
(June 30, 2011, 7:59 PM), http://www.newsandtech.com/news/article_09154504-a386-11 
e0-af5e-001cc4c03286.html (interview by Chuck Moozakis); Edmonds et al., supra note 
38. 
113 See KOVARIK, supra note 34, at 232–35. 
114 See id. at 232. 
115 See id. at 232–35. 
116 See id. at 235. 
117 See, e.g., Suzanne Perry, NPR’s New CEO Takes Over as Radio Adjusts to the 
Digital Age, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (May 9, 2014), https://www.philanthropy.com 
/article/NPR-s-New-CEO-Takes-Over-as/153141. 
118 See Nielsen, supra note 45, at 7. 
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unique possibilities that nationwide internet access provides.119 
Likewise, media firms that embrace the low-entry costs and low-
operating costs that digital content provides stand in a position to gain 
significant national and local market share.120 Indeed, creative media 
and non-media firms who take advantage of these changes to cost 
structure pose the biggest risk to newspapers in the twenty-first 
century.121 For example, Google, Yahoo, and similar content 
providers generate enormous revenue at an incredibly low cost by 
simply aggregating content that others create.122 
However, as the FCC observed, the void left after the displacement 
of local media often finds no digital substitute of any kind for that 
area.123 Commercial radio and cable channels do little to assist the 
problem because they play a small role in reporting local news.124 
Public television offers limited local programming while public radio 
stations—which do perform local reporting—have limited resources, 
particularly in smaller markets.125 As the FCC noted in discussing 
local newsbroadcasts, “too few are investing in more reporting on 
critical local issues and some have cut back staff.”126 While 
consumers commenting on and sharing news can help a story flourish, 
this process does not work for a local story that never exists in the 
first place.127 
II 
UNDERSTANDING DEFAMATION AND ITS COMMON LAW 
PARAMETERS 
A. Defamation Elements and Common Law Vestiges 
Courts have long recognized a person’s reputation as an interest 
justifying legal protection.128 A key protection for this reputational 
 
119 STEVEN WALDMAN, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES 191 (2011), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/The_Information_Needs_of_Communities.pdf. 
120 See Nielsen, supra note 45, at 7. 
121 See MEYER, supra note 29, at 210, 212. 
122 See Freedman, supra note 19, at 46. 
123 See SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 2, 9–10; WALDMAN, supra note 119, at 5. 
124 See WALDMAN, supra note 119, at 5. 
125 See id. Many have, however, cited National Public Radio as a model for the 
principle that nonprofit journalism can work. See MEYER, supra note 29, at 208. 
126 WALDMAN, supra note 119, at 5–6. 
127 SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 3. 
128 Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 1341, 1345 (2011). 
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interest is a claim for defamation, which protects a person’s 
reputation against false and derogatory communications.129 As 
opposed to an economic tort or a tort involving a person’s physical 
security, defamation is sometimes referred to as a dignitary tort.130 
Other dignitary torts include (1) invasion of privacy; (2) the various 
claims, such as malicious abuse of process, that fall under the 
category of misuse of the judicial process; and (3) intentional 
interference with important familial relationships.131 While there was 
a historical distinction between slander and libel, based on whether 
the speech was oral or in writing respectively, the two are effectively 
the same cause of action in modern times.132 
While consisting essentially of only the first three elements in its 
original common law formulation, a defamation claim, in the majority 
of states, involves proof of all or nearly all of the following elements: 
(1) publication of a defamatory statement, (2) concerning the 
plaintiff,133 (3) to a third person, (4) in a negligent or other faulty 
manner, (5) involving a false statement, and (6) damages.134 The 
common law standard for defamation liability was effectively strict 
liability because a plaintiff did not have to prove any fault as an 
element of the claim.135 It is still an open question from a 
constitutional standpoint whether a plaintiff must prove some fault—
 
129 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 
111, 116 (5th ed. 1984). 
130 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 512‒14 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp. 
2016). 
131 Id. § 514, at 161. 
132 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, §§ 111, 112. 
133 Notably, criticism directed generally at a large group of people such as lawyers or 
car dealers is not actionable. See id. § 111. 
134 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 519, at 173‒74. A comparable tort that is 
highly similar to defamation but that courts treat as distinct is a claim for injurious 
falsehood which has the following elements that a plaintiff must prove: (1) publication of a 
provably false communication, (2) of and concerning the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s 
pecuniary interests, (3) with knowledge of the statement’s falsity or recklessness as to its 
falsity, (4) when pecuniary harm to the defendant was intended or foreseeable, and (5) 
resulting pecuniary harm. See id. § 656, at 619‒20. The same protections to defamation 
claims, including constitutional limits, carry over to such claims. See id. § 656, at 620. 
135 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755–60 
(1984); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 557 (“That would mean that in the private person 
case where the issue is not of public concern, the states would also be free to presume 
falsehood as well as damages, and possibly even to presume that the defendant was at 
fault; courts could go back to the old common law of prima facie strict liability in this 
class of cases.”). 
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such as negligence as to the truth or falsity of a statement—in all 
defamation cases, even when no public persons or issues of public 
concern are involved.136 Except when the First Amendment requires 
actual proof of falsity,137 various courts treat the truth of the 
statement as an affirmative defense for common law defamation.138 
Nevertheless, many state courts have now adopted falsity as an 
element of a defamation claim apart from any constitutional 
obligation to do so.139 
Importantly, opinions are often not actionable because they do not 
contain a statement of fact, a rule that exists at common law and, in 
some instances, has a constitutional dimension.140 Notably, the 
Supreme Court rejected the principle that opinions should receive 
absolute protection under the First Amendment because opinions may 
imply assertion of an objective fact.141 However, when the speech 
involves a public figure or a matter of public concern, the opinion 
statement must be provably false in order to be actionable.142 This 
First Amendment rule has essentially constitutionalized the common 
law privilege of fair comment, which protects the right of every 
person to fairly express opinions on matters of public interest and 
general concern.143 The constitutional protection is greater than what 
is available at common law because the constitutional protection is 
absolute even if the defendant acted with actual malice because the 
 
136 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986); Dombey v. Phx. 
Newspapers, Inc., 724 P.2d 562, 567 (Ariz. 1986); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, §§ 557‒
58. While it may be the case that a dispute involving a media defendant will generally 
involve a matter of public concern, there is a danger in simply assuming that it will—a 
distinction that some courts do not carefully articulate by automatically requiring a 
heightened standard of proof against media defendants. See Fawcett v. Rogers, 492 
S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. App. 2016) (defining elements differently for “suit by a private 
person against a non-media defendant”). 
137 See infra Part III. 
138 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (“The state rule of 
law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 
129, §§ 113, 116. Notably, substantial truth is sufficient versus absolute truth. See, e.g., 
Kevin L. Kite, Incremental Identities: Libel-Proof Plaintiffs, Substantial Truth, and the 
Future of the Incremental Harm Doctrine, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 535 (1998). 
139 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 519. 
140 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
141 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990). 
142 See id. at 19–20. 
143 See id. at 13–14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1977); Lisa K. West, Note, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.—Demise of the Opinion 
Privilege in Defamation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 647, 655–59 (1991). 
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opinion simply cannot be proven false.144 A few state courts have 
also applied the common law privilege of fair comment to statements 
of fact made in connection with statements of opinion—in other 
words, requiring proof of actual malice—although the Restatement 
formulation does not go that far.145 
As it relates to the underlying proof of common law defamation, 
establishing liability based on an opinion also presents substantive 
problems. Under the Restatement’s approach, an opinion can be 
defamatory only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory 
facts as the basis for the opinion.146 Many states follow this 
approach.147 Unfortunately, an extended discussion of the process for 
determining when an opinion can give rise to liability is a complex 
subject that is beyond the scope of this Article.148 For purposes of this 
Article, it is helpful to understand that several recurring situations 
relating to statements about a business’s products or services often 
qualify as opinions. Examples include the following: (1) a consumer’s 
online review of a business or its product, such as a one-star rating;149 
(2) the review of an organization—such as a media organization—
about a business or its product;150 (3) a conclusion in a review or 
 
144 See Lewis v. Rapp, 725 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“Therefore, we must 
determine whether defendant’s statement was merely an opinion on a matter of public 
concern. If it was, then defendant is not liable for defamation and the inquiry ends.”); 
Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1122 (Or. 2016). 
145 See Cassidy v. Merin, 582 A.2d 1039, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) 
(requiring proof of actual malice under fair comment privilege for statements of fact); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Many courts 
have in fact rejected that the fair comment privilege applies to statements of fact, see 
Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70, 75–76 (W. Va. 1981), and the Restatement 
drafters have done away with separate fair comment privileges on the basis that a 
statement of opinion otherwise covered by a fair comment privilege is no longer actionable 
at all. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 606–10 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(explaining that these sections regarding fair comment are omitted because opinions that 
do not imply a defamatory statement are no longer actionable). 
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
147 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 571. 
148 See, e.g., Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 579–81 (Tex. 2002) (discussing 
various approaches courts have used to determine whether something is an opinion). Many 
scholars provide helpful guidance on this issue. See Richard H.W. Maloy, The Odyssey of 
a Supreme Court Decision about the Sanctity of Opinions Under the First Amendment, 19 
TOURO L. REV. 119, 173–76 (2002); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, §§ 68–70. 
149 See Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2016); Bedford v. 
Spassoff, 485 S.W.3d 641, 651–52 (Tex. App. 2016). 
150 See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009); Moldea v. N.Y. Times 
Co., 22 F.3d 310, 313–14 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing in context of book review). 
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otherwise that a given service or product is not a good value;151 and 
(4) a rating issued by a BBB organization reflecting the BBB’s 
assessment of the business’s customer interactions.152 However, 
individual cases, in the context of determining whether a statement is 
a non-actionable opinion, can be difficult to predict. For instance, a 
statement that a product “didn’t work” as part of a review could 
qualify as asserting implied facts.153 
The various sources of content on the web—such as user blogs, 
social media sites, and crowdsourced review sites which did not have 
a comparable analog before the Internet—provide a whole new 
battleground for defamation litigation.154 Because of dramatic 
differences between digital publication and other traditional forms of 
publication, common law defamation principles sometimes show their 
age in a digital world.155 For instance, under traditional defamation 
rules, every repetition of a defamatory statement—including 
repetition of another’s statement—qualifies as a publication.156 
Publication is a term of art which includes any communication, by 
any method, to a third person who is not the plaintiff.157 By 
republishing the statement, a person is subject to the same liability as 
if the person had published the statement originally.158 Until the 
Communications Decency Act significantly changed the liability 
scheme for republication online, courts would determine whether the 
defendant was a publisher, distributor, or common carrier, each of 
which have their own liability standards.159 Under common law 
principles, publishers—like newspapers, book publishers, or their 
online counterparts—have the opportunity to exercise extensive 
 
151 See NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Living Will Ctr., LLC, 870 P.2d 6, 13–14 
(Colo. 1994) (en banc). 
152 See infra text accompanying notes 353–354. 
153 See Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1052–55 (9th Cir. 1990). 
154 See Amy Kristin Sanders & Holly Miller, Revitalizing Rosenbloom: The Matter of 
Public Concern Standard in the Age of the Internet, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 529, 530–
31 (2014). 
155 See infra Part V (discussing various problems identified with defamation liability in 
particular publication scenarios in the context of the Communications Decency Act). 
156 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“In fact, every 
repetition of a defamatory statement is considered a publication.” (citing KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 129, § 113, at 799)). 
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
158 Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
159 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 129, § 113). 
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control over the final content they issue, which subjects them to a 
strict liability standard.160 Distributors—including booksellers, 
newsvendors, libraries, or any digital equivalent—only distribute 
content and thus would be liable at common law if they acted 
knowingly or negligently.161 Common carriers—like a telephone 
company or internet service provider—transmit information 
automatically with no chance to review its content, which exempted 
them from defamation liability.162 
Changes to common law rules are fully appropriate, given that the 
Internet has completely transformed the ability of information to 
travel and recirculate almost instantaneously.163 Compared to a world 
where it is difficult to gain access to a print, television, or radio 
platform, digital platforms dramatically expand a person’s ability to 
become part of the chain of publishing a statement.164 Everyone 
under the common law who takes part in a publication faces liability 
for the act of publishing that statement, even if that person is unaware 
of the contents.165 This classification system for publishers, 
distributors, and common carriers is difficult to apply to persons 
hosting content online and yields conflicting results.166 
In general, common law damage remedies for defamation include: 
(1) compensatory damages, which may be either general or special, 
(e.g., economic harm); and (2) punitive or exemplary damages.167 
General damages include the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation and 
the emotional distress suffered as a result of the injury.168 At common 
law, it is not necessary to prove actual harm to a person’s reputation 
 
160 See id. at 1104; Paul Ehrlich, Note, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401, 403 (2002). 
161 See Ehrlich, supra note 160. 
162 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to 
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 95–96 (1992). 
163 See Bauerlein, supra note 15, at vii–ix. 
164 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997); Bauerlein, supra 
note 15, at vii–ix. 
165 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. 
166 Ehrlich, supra note 160. 
167 Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 532 n.22 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 116A) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 621–623 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Bauerlein, 
supra note 15, at vii–ix. 
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to establish the underlying defamation claim.169 The presumption of 
harm that arises for the plaintiff in many situations embodies this 
principle.170 A prevailing plaintiff can recover nominal damages if he 
or she cannot otherwise prove entitlement to compensatory 
damages.171 Notably, there are some significant differences between 
the damages that a prevailing plaintiff can recover for defamation 
depending on whether that plaintiff is an individual or a business.172 
In particular, courts have held that a corporation is not capable of 
mental suffering, although it can pursue damages for injury to its 
reputation.173 
B. Defamation Privileges Recognized Under the Common Law 
Our legal system recognizes privileges in many areas of tort law 
where there is a significant societal interest in protecting desirable 
conduct. Essentially, a privilege is a societal determination that 
conduct within the scope of the privilege is per se reasonable.174 A 
privilege is much stronger than a factual defense to liability. For 
instance, a privilege of self-defense actually defeats liability for 
battery while an argument that the battery was not intentional simply 
operates as a factual challenge to the plaintiff’s proof as to that 
element.175 The defendant generally bears the burden of establishing 
that a privilege applies as an affirmative defense.176 Importantly, 
determination of whether a privilege applies is a question of law, 
while determination of whether the defendant abused the privilege is 
generally a fact question for the jury.177 
There are several areas related to speech involving government 
proceedings where there is essentially an “absolute privilege to 
defame,” including judicial proceedings, legislative proceedings, and 
 
169 David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2006). 
170 See id. 
171 Sunward Corp., 811 F.2d at 532 n.22. 
172 Arlen W. Langvardt, A Principled Approach to Compensatory Damages in 
Corporate Defamation Cases, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 491, 518 (1990) (“Just as corporations and 
natural persons are different from each other, so are their respective reputational 
interests.”). 
173 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1139 n.10 
(7th Cir. 1987); KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 111. 
174 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 24. 
175 See id. 
176 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 114. 
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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executive communications.178 Other absolute privileges under the 
common law include (1) publications consented to, (2) publications 
between spouses, and (3) publications required by law.179 Absolute 
privilege is recognized in certain situations because of the importance 
society places on totally free expression in these situations.180 The 
Communications Decency Act, discussed in more detail later in this 
Article, effectively operates as an absolute privilege.181 
There are also certain qualified privileges that a defendant may 
invoke in a broader range of situations than an absolute privilege.182 
One qualified privilege addressed in more detail later in this Article is 
the privilege unique to BBB entities and comparable entities.183 There 
are several basic qualified privileges, including: (1) the public interest 
privilege which allows a person to publish materials to public officials 
on matters within their public responsibility, (2) the privilege to 
publish to someone who shares a common interest, (3) the privilege to 
publish to protect one’s own interest or the interest of others, (4) the 
fair comment privilege discussed above,184 and (5) the privilege to 
make a fair and accurate report of public proceedings.185 Generally, a 
defendant can lose these qualified privileges if the publication goes 
outside the scope of the privilege or through proof of improper 
motive.186 Defeating a privilege generally requires proof of actual 
malice, although a few states require only proof of negligence.187 
As it relates to liability for entities commenting on a business’s 
products or services, the most important of these privileges arise 
when the speaker makes the statement for the protection of his own 
 
178 O. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of Truthful Personnel 
Information: Some Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified 
Privilege to Defame, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 305, 311 (1998); see also KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 129, § 114. 
179 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 538. 
180 Reed & Henkel, supra note 178, at 311. 
181 See infra Part V; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, §§ 543–44. 
182 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 544; KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
183 See infra Part IV(B). 
184 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990); Lewis v. Rapp, 725 
S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. 2012); Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1122 (Or. 2016); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977); West, supra note 
143. 
185 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 544. 
186 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
187 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 344–346 (discussing these issues in more detail). 
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interest or the interest of another.188 The basic parameters for these 
privileges appear in sections 594 and 595 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts. Any defendant can assert either privilege, although the 
courts treat the privileges narrowly.189 
Under Section 594, the privilege applies in the context of a 
publication appropriate to effectuate the privilege when: (1) there is 
information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the 
publisher, and (2) the recipient’s knowledge of the defamatory matter 
will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest.190 The 
privilege is not reliable because it involves frequently unpredictable 
weighing of the publisher’s interests against the harm to others from 
the publication.191 This privilege most frequently applies when a 
person is defending his or her own reputation against another’s 
defamation, safeguarding a financial interest, or protecting his or her 
interest in their own personal safety.192 
The privilege outlined in Section 595 applies when: (1) the 
information communicated impacts a sufficiently important interest of 
the recipient or a third person, and (2) either (a) the recipient is one to 
whom the publisher is under a legal duty to publish the defamatory 
matter, or (b) is a person to whom the statement’s publication would 
otherwise fall within the generally accepted standards of decent 
conduct.193 The “generally accepted standard of decent conduct” 
limitation is significant because the Restatement encourages 
application of that basis for protection when either (1) the publication 
is made in response to a request rather than when volunteered by the 
publisher, or (2) when a family or other preexisting relationship exists 
between the parties.194 Most frequently, a court will recognize that 
 
188 The common interest privilege can be important but is relatively narrow and applies 
only to those with very close associations—for instance those associated with one another 
through the same business organization, joint property owners, and organizations with a 
shared interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); 
DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 2:24 (2008 & Supp. 2016); 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
189 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594–95 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
190 See id. § 594. 
191 See id. § 594 cmt. e. 
192 See id. § 595; ELDER, supra note 188, § 2:23; KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 
115. 
193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); ELDER, supra 
note 188, § 2:25. 
194 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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the privilege applies when the publisher has a legal or fiduciary 
obligation to the person to whom he is making the statement.195 
Abuse of a qualified privilege defeats that privilege. As mentioned 
above, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that a privilege 
applies, while the plaintiff normally bears the burden of proving it 
was abused.196 Under the Restatement approach, abuse of the 
privilege occurs when (1) the publisher acts with knowledge or 
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory matter, (2) the 
defamatory matter is published for some purpose other than that for 
which the particular privilege is given, (3) the publication occurs to 
some person the speaker could not reasonably believe is necessary for 
the accomplishment of the privilege’s purpose, or (4) the publication 
includes defamatory matter the speaker could not reasonably believe 
is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is 
privileged.197 To use a classic example, a person accusing another of 
theft to protect the speaker’s interests could not necessarily rely on 
the privilege if, when the statement was made, third persons were 
present who were not necessary to effectuate the privilege.198 
III 
FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COMMENTS ON 
BUSINESS PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
To fully appreciate the protections available to entities who 
comment on the products and services of a business, it is necessary to 
understand the First Amendment protections that those entities can 
invoke. It is better to think of these protections not as a privilege that 
the defendant bears the burden of proving, but rather as a true 
modification of the common law elements or procedures for a 
defamation claim.199 Importantly, many entities who comment on a 
business’s products and services have no other special protections 
 
195 See ELDER, supra note 188, § 2:25. 
196 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
197 See Moore v. Cobb-Nettleton, 889 A.2d 1262, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (outlining 
same bases for abuse of privilege); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977). 
198 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
199 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 555 (“Because the burden under the Times-
Sullivan rule is upon the plaintiff, it is not even helpful to think of the Constitutional rule 
as a ‘privilege.’ A privilege is sustained only if the defendant carries the burden of proof 
and persuasion.”). 
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from liability than those the First Amendment provides. For instance, 
unlike a BBB entity which has a special privilege essentially unique 
to it,200 product review organizations, such as the nonprofit 
Consumers Union (more commonly referred to by the publication 
name Consumer Reports), generally can invoke only First 
Amendment protections.201 
The Supreme Court has enforced the various constitutional 
restrictions required by the First Amendment on other claims 
challenging speech, such as a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress202 and a claim for publication placing the plaintiff 
in a false light.203 Essentially, any tort claim based on a factual 
scenario similar to a defamation claim can implicate these 
protections.204 Likewise, a plaintiff cannot normally circumvent these 
First Amendment restrictions by asserting a negligence claim.205 A 
defendant may not invoke these First Amendment protections for 
general causes of action that do not single out speech, such as breach 
of contract and promissory estoppel claims.206 As addressed 
previously in this Article, one class of First Amendment protection 
for speech includes certain protections for opinions involving a matter 
of public concern akin to the common law privilege of fair 
comment.207 
 
200 See infra Part IV(B). 
201 Consumers Union arose primarily “because existing commercial and government 
institutions had failed to provide consumers with adequate information about competing 
products.” Sarah Deutsch, Note, Fair Use in Copyright Law and the Nonprofit 
Organization: A Proposal for Reform, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1327, 1354 (1985). This 
organization provides information such as reviews of various consumer products. See, e.g., 
Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu de P.R., Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 233 F.3d 24, 25–26 
(1st Cir. 2000). Fortunately, for entities like Consumers Union, those providing opinions 
about a business’s products or services can invoke the opinion doctrine as an effective 
defense to defamation claims. See supra text accompanying notes 140–153. 
202 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988). 
203 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376, 384–91 (1967). 
204 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, §§ 516, 656 (“Although occasionally a plaintiff will 
claim emotional distress or some other tort based on defamation-type facts, the defamation 
rules will ordinarily control.”). 
205 Id. § 516 (“Under traditional rules, then, the plaintiff cannot ordinarily avoid the 
defamation rules by pleading simple negligence. Instead, she must prove the elements of 
defamation, and she is subject to its limits.”). 
206 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670–71 (1991). 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 140–153. 
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A. Regulation of Commercial Speech 
One of the overarching themes in First Amendment jurisprudence 
is the neutral treatment of speech.208 Without a high judicial tolerance 
for protecting controversial views, the government could more easily 
distinguish between speech it does not like and speech it prefers.209 
However, commercial speech is generally entitled to a lower degree 
of protection than noncommercial speech. Outside the context of 
speech, courts generally review state and local government’s attempts 
to regulate economic activity under a rational basis standard.210 
The commercial nature of speech does not exempt that speech from 
First Amendment protection.211 Governmental entities have a large 
degree of discretion in regulating misleading commercial speech or 
commercial speech related to unlawful activities.212 On the other 
hand, that power “is more circumscribed” when the commercial 
speech falls outside of those categories.213 Specifically, the Supreme 
Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to restrictions of general 
commercial speech.214 In applying this intermediate scrutiny, the First 
Amendment mandates a three-part test: (1) the government must 
assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; (2) the 
government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial 
speech directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) the 
regulation must be narrowly drawn.215 In general, these more relaxed 
First Amendment protections give governments a good deal of 
flexibility in regulating misleading business advertising.216 This 
flexibility allows for significant state and federal regulation of 
deceptive business practices—including advertising.217 Many of these 
 
208 See Jendi Reiter, Serial Killer Trading Cards and First Amendment Values: A 
Defense of Content-Based Regulation of Violent Expression, 62 ALA. L. REV. 183, 183 
(1998). 
209 See id. 
210 Carol E. Garver, Lowe v. SEC: The First Amendment Status of Investment Advice 
Newsletters, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 1253, 1262 (1986). 
211 See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). 
212 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–
63 (1980). 
213 See id. at 564. 
214 Went for It, 515 U.S. at 623–24. 
215 Id. at 624. 
216 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563–66. 
217 See infra Part IV(A). 
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restrictions provide private rights of action which litigants and, in 
some instances, consumer-oriented organizations like a BBB entity 
can enforce.218 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the line between 
commercial and noncommercial speech “will not always be easy to 
draw.”219 As the Court explained, “[n]ormally the purpose or motive 
of the speaker is not central to First Amendment protection.”220 
However, the purpose “does bear on” the protected aspects of the 
speech in some instances such as determining whether a person is 
“engaged in associational activity for the advancement of beliefs and 
ideas” or whether the “purpose” of the speech at issue “was the 
advancement of his own commercial interests.”221 Many 
commentators have criticized the amorphous nature of these 
standards.222 However, for purposes of this Article, it is not necessary 
to dig into these distinctions. As outlined in more detail below, more 
critical constitutional distinctions that come up in suits against entities 
that comment on business products and services involve whether (1) 
the plaintiff is a public or private figure, or (2) the speech relates to a 
matter of public concern.223 
B. Private Versus Public Figures in Defamation Disputes 
Certain limitations apply to defamation and related claims that 
public officials or public figures pursue. In particular, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that it is necessary for a public official to prove, 
in addition to any common law requirements, that (1) the statement 
was false; and (2) was made with actual malice, specifically in a 
knowing or reckless manner.224 As discussed in more detail below, 
there are both general-purpose and limited-purpose public figures 
under this analysis. A plaintiff must show with convincing clarity—a 
standard equivalent to clear and convincing evidence—that the 
 
218 See id. 
219 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 
MD. L. REV. 55, 83–87 (1999) (gathering commentary of various scholars who have 
criticized the imprecise lines governing commercial speech). 
223 See infra Parts IV(B)–(C). 
224 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775–76 (1986); Curtis Publ’g Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 
(1964). 
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statement was made with actual malice.225 Most courts that have 
addressed the issue have held that proof of falsity must also meet the 
standard of clear and convincing evidence, although there is no 
definitive decision from the Supreme Court on this issue.226 These 
heightened standards reflect a tolerance for erroneous statements as a 
necessary risk in a robust public debate.227 Courts must independently 
review on appeal that the plaintiff met these requirements to ensure 
that a judgment against the defendant does not constitute a forbidden 
intrusion on the field of free expression.228 
The policy basis for this distinction between public and private 
figures involves several practical considerations. First, a public figure 
has significantly greater access to channels of communication—such 
as media platforms—which provides a public figure with a more 
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than a private 
figure who does not have such access.229 Likewise, public officials 
necessarily run the risk of closer public scrutiny given that “the 
public’s interest extends to anything which might touch on an 
official’s fitness for office.”230 For private persons who are general-
purpose public figures as it relates to any suit they bring, the Court 
has found that they are in a similar position to a public official 
because those who attain this status have assumed roles of special 
prominence in society’s affairs.231 Those general-purpose public 
figures have also, in many instances, voluntarily exposed themselves 
to increased risk of defamation.232 The Supreme Court recognized 
that even if these policy rationales do not apply in every instance the 
media must be able to assume public officials and figures have taken 
these considerations into account.233 
A key factor to determine whether a person is a limited-purpose 
public figure is the nature and extent of an individual’s participation 
 
225 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). 
226 DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 113–15 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing authorities); 
contra Bressler v. Fortune Magazine, 971 F.2d 1226, 1242 (6th Cir. 1992). 
227 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270–72. 
228 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508 (1984). 
229 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
230 Id. at 344–45. 
231 Id. at 345. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
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in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.234 A 
dispositive factor is often whether the person thrust himself or herself 
into the vortex of a public issue or engaged the public’s attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome.235 To further refine this analysis, 
lower courts have adopted more specific tests to apply the Supreme 
Court’s standards.236 A representative test adopted by the Fifth 
Circuit and D.C. Circuit is whether (1) the controversy at issue must 
be public both in the sense that people are discussing it and people 
other than the immediate participants in the controversy are likely to 
feel the impact of its resolution; (2) the plaintiff must have more than 
a trivial or tangential role in the controversy; and (3) the alleged 
defamation must be germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the 
controversy.237 As this Article focuses on the liability of entities 
commenting on business products and services, a detailed discussion 
of these standards for private persons is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the 
issue, lower courts have recognized that corporations and other 
entities may qualify as a general-purpose or limited-purpose public 
figure.238 Most courts have resisted automatic treatment of even 
publically traded companies as general-purpose public figures with a 
preference towards assessing whether the company is a limited-
purpose public figure under the circumstances of the case.239 
However, a limited number of courts have expressed skepticism that 
 
234 Id. at 352. 
235 Id. 
236 See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571–72 (Tex. 1998) 
(discussing tests adopted by the Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, 
Eleventh Circuit, and D.C. Circuit); see also 4 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: 
LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 36:39 (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2016) (discussing approaches 
various courts across the country take including for more specific situations such as 
criminals and doctors). 
237 Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Many interesting problems 
can arise in trying to assess the effect of digital platforms unique to the Internet, such as 
what significance should a person’s appearance in a popular blog post have on determining 
whether that individual has become a public figure. See Sanders & Miller, supra note 154, 
at 531. 
238 See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589–90 (1st Cir. 
1980); see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 561. 
239 See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 589–90; Lynn B. Oberlander, Corporate 
Plaintiffs: Public or Private Figures?, 16 COMM. L. 1 (1998). 
WALTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017 8:13 PM 
2017] When Can You Shoot the Messenger? Understanding the 217 
Legal Protections for Entities Providing Information on Business Products and 
Services in the Digital Age 
they should ever treat a business as a private person.240 The policy 
rationale for not automatically classifying businesses as public figures 
includes the following: (1) a legal entity does not automatically have 
a greater advantage than an individual in accessing channels of 
communication to dispute statements about that entity;241 (2) some 
entities are far more likely to become notorious or household names 
than others depending on their national or regional prominence;242 
and (3) many entities do not receive the same type of media scrutiny 
as others.243 These policy concerns are consistent with the fact that 
many for-profit and nonprofit enterprises operating as an entity have 
limited operations and thus are comparable to a private person. For 
example, in 2012 the U.S. Census Bureau reported that enterprises 
with less than twenty employees employed 17.6% of the country 
while enterprises with twenty to ninety-nine employees employed 
16.7% of the country.244 
Courts that have questioned whether a business could ever qualify 
as a private person, focused instead on the inapplicability of the 
Supreme Court’s policy rationales for protection of private persons. 
Specifically, those policies target uniquely human interests that 
corporations do not possess.245 For example, some courts emphasize 
that large corporations sacrifice significant privacy by taking specific 
action to be in the public eye.246 Recent First Amendment case law, 
in particular Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which 
emphasizes that corporate entities should not receive less favorable 
treatment under the First Amendment, indicates that the Court would 
not in an automatic matter treat all legal entities as public figures.247 
 
240 See, e.g., Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 486–87 
(Minn. 1985). 
241 Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 589–90 (“To the extent that access to the channels of 
communication is a meaningful factor, we suspect that many, if not most, corporations 
have no particular advantage over private individuals.” (footnote omitted)). 
242 See Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329–30 (5th Cir. 1993). 
243 See id. 
244 ANTHONY CARUSO, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL 
SUMMARY: 2012 1 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publica 
tions/2015/econ/g12-susb.pdf. 
245 Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 486. 
246 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
247 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 355 (2010). 
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Unfortunately, there is no uniform test for determining whether an 
entity is a limited-purpose public figure,248 which makes case 
outcomes unpredictable.249 A comprehensive discussion of these 
issues is worthy of its own article and is thus beyond the scope of this 
one.250 It is more predictable that an entity which actively injects 
itself in the public discussion of an issue, such as an advocacy 
organization, will qualify as a limited-purpose public figure as it 
relates to that advocacy issue.251 Beyond that, cases can be much less 
predictable. Some courts have, for instance, held that—at least as it 
relates to consumer reporting on their goods and services—businesses 
such as restaurants that engage in commerce with the general public 
are limited-purpose public figures as it relates to those commercial 
activities.252 Other courts encountering very similar circumstances for 
businesses engaging in commerce with the general public have 
reached the opposite conclusion, finding such businesses to be private 
figures.253 
This area would greatly benefit from Supreme Court intervention 
to better clarify the appropriate standards. It is far simpler to compare 
one individual to another in terms of their public/private statuses 
because it is easier to measure their spheres of involvement in a given 
issue.254 Legal entities, by comparison, can vary in size from an entity 
run by one person to a Fortune 500 company with international 
 
248 See Oberlander, supra note 239, at 1–5. For a variety of illustrations of this 
principle, see also Annotation, Who Is “Public Figure” for Purposes of Defamation 
Action, 19 A.L.R.5TH 1, §§ 138‒80 (1994 & Supp. 2016). 
249 See Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(acknowledging the general difficulty of determining public or private status and the 
greater difficulty for corporations). 
250 For a good discussion of the existing standards, see generally Oberlander, supra 
note 239. 
251 See World Wide Ass’n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1136–37 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
252 See Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 454 (Ind. 1999); see 
also Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 57 P.3d 82, 91–92 (Nev. 2002) (gathering various 
authorities). 
253 See, e.g., Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70, 74 (W. Va. 1981). 
254 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Tavoulareas v. 
Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 
F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1987); WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571–72 
(Tex. 1998) (discussing tests adopted by the Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, 
Sixth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and D.C. Circuit); 4 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT 
LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 36:39 (2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2016) (discussing 
approaches various courts across the country take including for more specific situations 
such as criminals and doctors); Sanders & Miller, supra note 154, at 531. 
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scope.255 The lack of consistent standards makes it unpredictable to 
determine whether a court will treat an entity as a private figure, a 
limited-purpose private figure, or a general public figure.256 
C. Speech on Matters of Public Concern 
As it relates to entities who comment on the products and services 
of businesses, a key protection comes into play when the speech 
involves matters of public concern. Specifically, in those situations, 
the plaintiff’s claim is limited in the following ways: he or she (1) 
must prove that the statement was false, (2) must prove that the 
defendant was negligent or otherwise at fault in failing to determine 
or state the truth, (3) must prove actual harm, and (4) cannot recover 
anything except actual damages absent proof of actual malice.257 
These limitations apply because limiting speech on public issues 
creates a threat to the free and robust debate of those issues.258 In 
turn, the threat of liability creates a risk of self-censorship for those 
attempting to engage in that debate.259 
These constitutional protections modify the common law rule that 
the defendant bears the burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, 
the truth of the statement.260 Speech deals with a matter of public 
concern when it (1) can be fairly considered as relating to any matter 
of political, social, or other concern to the community; or (2) is a 
subject of legitimate news interest—that is, a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public.261 Importantly, 
determination of whether an issue is a matter of public concern is a 
 
255 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) 
(explaining that “96% of the 3 million businesses that belong to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce have fewer than 100 employees”). 
256 See, e.g., Jenna Morton, Note, Online Business Reviews and the Public Figure 
Doctrine: An Advertising-Based Standard, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 403, 416–20 
(2012) (discussing policy considerations that arise in drawing these lines and disparate 
standards applied by courts). 
257 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777–78 (1986); Gertz, 418 U.S. 
at 347–49; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 556. 
258 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). 
259 Id. 
260 Phila. Newspapers Inc., 475 U.S. at 776. 
261 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453. “The arguably inappropriate or controversial character of a 
statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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legal question for the Court.262 There is a good deal of authority 
recognizing the general proposition that a business’s products and 
services sold to the public do relate to a matter of public concern—
including customer complaints or statements that someone should not 
do business with a company.263 As the Second Circuit has explained: 
“Indeed, the common law recognizes that publications commenting 
on ‘persons who present[] themselves or their services or goods to the 
public’ are matters of public concern.”264 The same principle is true 
for speech involving deceptive business practices such as a business 
unethically soliciting clients.265 
While not expressly decided in the context of a defamation case, 
the Supreme Court, in its 2011 decision in Snyder v. Phelps, largely 
confirmed that non-media defendants can invoke the First 
Amendment’s protections when the speech at issue relates to a matter 
of public concern.266 Specifically, in Snyder, the Supreme Court held 
that a church could raise a First Amendment defense to an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim because its picketing activities 
implicated a matter of public concern.267 Some courts have 
previously excluded non-media defendants from invoking these First 
Amendment protections.268 Importantly, in cases involving First 
 
262 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–86 (1987); D’Angelo v. Sch. Bd. of 
Polk Cty., Fla., 497 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007). At least as a general matter, the 
flexible test for whether something is a matter of public concern creates many challenges 
in determining whether a court will conclude that something is of public concern. See 
generally Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable 
Standard Mingles with News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39 (2012). 
263 See Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 1990) (statements about 
product effectiveness aired on 60 Minutes were a matter of public concern); Sisler v. 
Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083, 1092 (N.J. 1986) (expressing that “commercial activities or 
products implicat[e] a matter of legitimate public concern”); Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. 
Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 872 A.2d 1202, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (expressing that 
“statements at issue related to consumer complaints and, therefore, touched upon a matter 
of public concern”), aff’d, 923 A.2d 389 (Pa. 2007). 
264 Flamm v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 4.4.4 (3d ed. 1999)) (citing 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115). 
265 See id. at 150. 
266 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458. 
267 See id. at 451–52, 458–59. 
268 See, e.g., Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 446 (Iowa 2013) (rejecting protection 
for non-media defendant); Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 152–53 (Wis. 1982) (same); 
see also Fleming v. Moore, 275 S.E.2d 632, 638 n.11 (Va. 1981) (“Lower courts are 
divided on whether the First Amendment protections provided media defendants in New 
York Times and Gertz are applicable to non-media defendants.”); Phillips, supra note 1, at 
180–84. 
WALTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017 8:13 PM 
2017] When Can You Shoot the Messenger? Understanding the 221 
Legal Protections for Entities Providing Information on Business Products and 
Services in the Digital Age 
Amendment protection against intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claims for media defendants, the Supreme Court has relied on 
its First Amendment cases in the defamation arena as the basis for 
those limitations.269 In particular, starting with Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, the Supreme Court relied on its New York Times v. 
Sullivan decision to conclude that a public figure must prove actual 
malice to recover under an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim.270 The Supreme Court expressly relied upon both the Sullivan 
decision and the Hustler Magazine decision as key cases supporting 
its conclusions in Snyder.271 The emphasis on media defendants that 
appears in some prior decisions appears now here in the Snyder 
decision.272 
Furthermore, while the Supreme Court in Snyder does not actually 
reference a distinction between media and non-media defendants, this 
issue was central to the case. The Fourth Circuit, whose decision the 
Supreme Court affirmed in Snyder, specifically rejected this 
distinction.273 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court had not “specifically addressed the question of whether the 
constitutional protections afforded to statements not provably false 
should apply with equal force to both media and non-media 
defendants.”274 Hedging from the Supreme Court on this issue in 
older cases muddies these waters.275 Scholarly articles immediately 
preceding the Court’s 2011 Snyder decision have also noted that this 
question was an open one.276 The Fourth Circuit followed the Second 
and Eighth Circuits in finding against such a distinction: 
 Like those two circuits, we believe that the First Amendment 
protects non-media speech on matters of public concern that does 
not contain provably false factual assertions. Any effort to justify a 
media/non-media distinction rests on unstable ground, given the 
difficulty of defining with precision who belongs to the “media.” 
 
269 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
270 See id. 
271 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451–52 (quoting from Sullivan and Hustler Magazine). 
272 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986). 
273 See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009). 
274 See id. 
275 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (explaining 
that a “statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can 
be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a 
media defendant is involved”). 
276 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1, at 175–76, 183–84. 
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And, more importantly, the Supreme Court has concluded that the 
“inherent worth of speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of 
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or 
individual.”277 
Notably, the D.C. Circuit in 1975, the Third Circuit in 1980, and 
the Tenth Circuit in 1985 also reached the same conclusion as these 
other circuits in rejecting the media/non-media distinction.278 
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s Snyder decision, the Ninth Circuit 
also joined these other circuits while also recognizing that the 
Supreme Court has not resolved the issue.279 
Logically, if the Supreme Court felt any distinction between media 
and non-media defendants existed, it would not have been possible 
for the Supreme Court to reach the conclusion it did in Snyder.280 
However, some state court cases decided after Snyder still distinguish 
between media and non-media defendants on this issue.281 
Consequently, the Supreme Court must more emphatically clarify 
whether any distinction exists. 
While an argument could be made that the Supreme Court has not 
yet extended the First Amendment protections from its defamation 
case law to non-media defendants, its actions in Snyder seriously 
undercut that argument. Furthermore, the Supreme Court previously 
invoked the Sullivan line of cases to invalidate a criminal statute used 
to convict a district attorney—clearly not a member of the media—
who criticized several judges at a press conference.282 The Supreme 
Court also recently emphasized that it has “consistently rejected the 
proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege 
beyond that of other speakers.”283 
 
277 Snyder, 580 F.3d at 219 n.13 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 777 (1978)). 
278 See Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Socorro Consol. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410 (10th 
Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting “dangerous 
disequilibrium between the first amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and the 
press”); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
279 Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291 (9th Cir. 2014). 
280 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Public Concern and Outrageous Speech: Testing the 
Inconstant Boundaries of IIED and the First Amendment Three Years After Snyder v. 
Phelps, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 437, 477 (2014) (noting that Snyder applies to non-media 
defendants). 
281 See Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 446–48 (Iowa 2013) (examining the need 
to reject a distinction in relation to matters of public concern, but continuing to 
maintaining the distinction). 
282 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 64–68 (1964). 
283 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010). 
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As outlined above in the discussion of the dramatically changing 
face of the media, such a media and non-media distinction would be 
impractical in modern times.284 To maintain such a distinction would 
put the courts in the position of gauging the merit and quality of the 
speech based on the purported media credentials of the author.285 
Putting courts in the position of drawing those lines will simply cause 
more problems than it will solve. The Supreme Court has fortunately 
demonstrated its willingness to embrace digital platforms and media, 
such as video games, as simply a new type of platform versus 
something that requires different legal treatment under the First 
Amendment.286 
IV 
LIABILITY OF BBB ENTITIES AND COMPARABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
PERFORMING CONSUMER-PROTECTION FUNCTIONS 
A. History of the Better Business Bureau and Related Organizations 
In the early 1900s, there was a movement that businesses largely 
spearheaded for truth-in-advertising regulations and industry best 
practices on advertising.287 Industry advertising groups like the 
Association of Advertising Clubs of America arose to encourage 
advertisers to promote the benefits of truthful advertising and to 
discourage deceptive advertising practices.288 Such organizations that 
promote industry regulation are now called self-regulatory 
organizations.289 These advertising groups began pushing for state 
regulation of advertising practices, which resulted in almost every 
state adopting truth-in-advertising regulations by the end of the 
 
284 See supra Part I. Notably, as it relates to social media, some commentators have 
observed a different problem potentially created by the Supreme Court’s broad standards 
on when an issue is a matter of public concern. See generally Douglas Behrens, Article, 
Balancing Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and First Amendment 
Protections in Snyder v. Phelps, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 213, 216, 227–
29 (2013). Specifically, there has been criticism that “the public concern test is easily 
satisfied and rarely would speech fail to meet this standard” which can have unintended 
consequences with modern social media platforms. See id. at 229. 
285 See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13; supra text accompanying note 277. 
286 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–92, 799 (2011). 
287 Zeynep K. Hansen & Marc T. Law, The Political Economy of Truth-in-Advertising 
Regulation During the Progressive Era, 51 J.L. & ECON. 251, 254 (2008). 
288 See id. 
289 See, e.g., Levi, supra note 111, at 663–64. 
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1920s.290 The BBB and its related local branches played a large role 
in this heightened focus on advertising practices, including lobbying 
for tighter laws on business practices and, in some instances, 
enforcing these legal standards against businesses.291 Many of these 
advertising clubs not associated with the BBB were eventually 
supplanted by BBB entities.292 BBB organizations are organized as 
nonprofit entities headed by the Council of Better Business 
Bureaus.293 
At the federal level, these trends in advertising restrictions 
convinced Congress in 1938 to grant the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) broad authority to pursue cases against businesses engaging in 
deceptive practices.294 Previously, at the FTC’s creation in 1914, its 
enforcement authority was focused on unfair methods of competition 
in the form of anti-competitive practices.295 These FTC powers are 
still in place under 15 U.S.C. § 45, which provides the FTC with 
enforcement authority and declares in § 45(a)(1) that: “Unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful.”296 This general grant of authority is not 
 
290 See Hansen & Law, supra note 287, at 254–55. 
291 See id.; Timothy Noah, Is the Better Business Bureau a Protection Racket?, SLATE 
(Dec. 7, 2010, 7:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/2010/12 
/busted_watchdog.html (“The Better Business Bureau is a national network of local 
nonprofit groups that evolved during the early years of the 20th century to expose fraud—
initially mainly patent medicines and stock swindles—in America’s burgeoning 
advertising industry.”). 
292 See Hansen & Law, supra note 287, at 254–55. 
293 See Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 391 n.1 
(Pa. 2007); David G. Mallen, Deputy Director for Legal Affairs, Nat’l Advert. Div. of the 
Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, C. Lee Peeler, Vice President, The Council of Better Bus. 
Bureaus, CEO & President, Advert. Self-Regulatory Council, & Linda Sherry, Dir. Nat’l 
Priorities for Consumer Action, Panel at the Seventh Annual Judicial Symposium on Civil 
Justice Issues: Centennial of the Council of Better Business Bureaus: The Important Role 
of Self-Regulatory Organizations (Nov. 12, 2012), 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 443, 443–45 
(2013). 
294 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 41–58 (2012)). 
295 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012)); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 
421–22 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how expansion of these FTC powers 
on unfair and deceptive practices occurred in 1938). 
296 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). With this authority under 15 U.S.C. § 45, Congress intended 
to grant the FTC with broad authority to stop unfair and deceptive business practices. See 
Atl. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965); Slough v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 396 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1968). 
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enforceable by private litigants.297 The FTC has the power to enforce 
various statutes under its jurisdiction administratively, as well as 
through the court system.298 The modern form of these state 
regulations are primarily the deceptive trade practice acts that state 
legislatures have enacted.299 
The BBB and its local branches have, from the early twentieth 
century to the present, played a large role in (1) monitoring local 
advertising, (2) receiving complaints about businesses from 
consumers and others, (3) investigating suspicious business practices, 
(4) cooperating with governmental agencies who regulate business 
activities, and (5) in some instances, threatening enforcement and 
enforcing legal restrictions on deceptive business practices against 
businesses.300 Besides educating businesses that deceptive practices 
are simply poor business, BBB entities also played a large role in 
educating the public about questionable business practices.301 Given 
the increasingly large number of businesses throughout the United 
States, the BBB’s role in modern times has shifted more to a service 
that helps formally and informally mediate and even arbitrate disputes 
between consumers and businesses.302 
 
297 See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988–89, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
Some have argued that it would significantly increase consumer protection laws to provide 
a private right of action under this section. See generally Stephanie L. Kroeze, Note, The 
FTC Won’t Let Me Be: The Need for a Private Right of Action Under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 227 (2015). 
298 See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)–(b); Jacob Siegel Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 327 U.S. 608, 
610–12 (1946) (discussing administrative powers of FTC). 
299 See Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little 
FTC Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 373–77 (1990). 
300 See Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 281–82 
(1945) (discussing chartered functions of D.C. BBB); Antwerp Diamond Exch.v. Better 
Bus. Bureau of Maricopa Cty, 637 P.2d 733, 736 (Ariz. 1981) (discussing purposes of 
BBB); Hansen & Law, supra note 287, at 254–55; Richard Potomac, Comment, Are You 
Sure You Want to Eat That?: U.S. Government and Private Regulation of Domestically 
Produced and Marketed Dietary Supplements, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 54, 80–82 
(2010). 
301 See, e.g., Better Bus. Bureau of Wash. D.C., 326 U.S. at 282 (describing chartered 
function of BBB entity as including “[e]ducation of consumers to be intelligent buyers”); 
Potomac, supra note 300, at 81–82. 
302 See Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, Slammed by the Government, A-rated by the 
Better Business Bureau, CNN MONEY (Sept. 30, 2015, 10:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com 
/2015/09/30/news/better-business-bureau/index.html?sr=twmoney093015bbbinvestigation 
1230pstory (“While many people view the BBB as a consumer watchdog or even a 
government agency, the BBB itself says this is a misconception. Instead, it views itself as 
a mediator between frustrated consumers and the companies they do business with, 
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Another important function that BBB entities serve is to provide 
ratings on businesses. The current rating system that BBB 
organizations use measures businesses on a scale of A+ to F.303 
Before 2009, the BBB rating system described a business as either 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.304 The current rating system evaluates, 
on a weighted scale, several factors, including: (1) a business’s 
complaint history with the BBB;305 (2) the type of business, as some 
types of businesses are more prone to questionable practices; (3) the 
length of time the business has operated; (4) lack of transparent 
business practices with consumers; (5) failure to honor any 
commitments to the BBB, such as failure to abide by a BBB 
mediation settlement or arbitration award; (6) any licensing or 
government actions known to the BBB;306 and (7) any advertising 
issues known to the BBB, such as questions about the business’s 
compliance with standards outlined in the BBB Code of 
Advertising.307 The complaint history, in particular, is a large factor 
in the rating and takes into account actions such as the business 
making meaningful responses and taking efforts to resolve 
complaints.308 The webpage associated with a business provides any 
consumer with access to much of this information, including the 
 
receiving nearly 1 million complaints each year from consumers . . . .”); Dispute 
Resolution Mediation Rules and Guide, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, 
http://www.bbb.org/bbb-dispute-handling-and-resolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-bro 
chures/dispute-resolution-mediation-rules-and-guide/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). See 
generally William D. Henderson, Arbitration Better Business Bureau Style, 33 LA. B. J. 81 
(1985). 
303 See Mallen et al., supra note 293, at 445; Overview of BBB Rating, COUNCIL OF 
BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, https://www.bbb.org/council/overview-of-bbb-grade/ (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Overview of BBB Rating]. 
304 Noah, supra note 291. 
305 The complaint history factors in: (a) the size of the business; (b) the total number of 
complaints; (c) the BBB’s assessment of whether the business has appropriately responded 
to complaints; (d) the BBB’s assessment of whether the business resolved the complaints 
in a timely manner to the customer’s satisfaction; (e) the BBB’s assessment of whether the 
business made a good faith effort to resolve complaints even if not to customers’ 
satisfaction; (f) the BBB’s assessment of whether the business has failed to resolve the 
underlying causes of the pattern of complaints; and (g) the age of complaints with newer 
complaints carrying more negative weight. See Overview of BBB Rating, supra note 303. 
306 The BBB treats it as a negative factor in the rating if the business fails to obtain 
appropriate licensing. See id. Finalized government actions that relate to a business’s 
marketplace activities, which the BBB deems to raise questions about the business’s ethics 
or reliability, have a negative effect on the rating. See id. Government actions are treated 
as major, moderate, or minor, and the older the action the less it negatively affects the 
rating. See id. 
307 See id.; see also Potomac, supra note 300, at 82–83 (discussing rating system). 
308 See Overview of BBB Rating, supra note 303. 
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business’s rating, its complaint history, specific complaints about the 
business, and governmental actions against the business.309 The 
consumer can also review the rating methodology from a business’s 
individual webpage to assess the BBB rating.310 
Similar to the decreasing levels of trust in media organizations, 
which are essentially at an all time low,311 BBB chapters have faced 
criticism over allegedly inaccurate ratings of businesses and 
complaints that it was necessary to be a BBB member to get the 
highest rating.312 Notably, the BBB network took action to remove 
membership as a criteria in relation to a rating313 and expelled some 
BBB member organizations who have not complied with its 
standards.314 BBB organizations also make an effort on a business’s 
webpage to explain the rating methodology so that a consumer can 
better evaluate the available information on the business.315 
It is also important to remember that self-regulatory agencies on 
business practices like the BBB, the Association of National 
Advertisers, and the American Advertising Federation help 
complement government enforcement against deceptive business 
practices.316 Even if they are not perfect, such organizations help hold 
businesses accountable for improper business practices and promote 
ethical standards that many businesses adopt voluntarily.317 
Particularly in an era of virtually unlimited commercial activity 
online, these self-regulatory organizations play a key role in 
protecting consumers and educating both businesses and 
 
309 See, e.g., Walt Disney World Company, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb 
.org/central-florida/business-reviews/amusement-parks-and-places/walt-disney-world-com 
pany-in-lake-buena-vista-fl-302238 (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
310 See id. 
311 See Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 
14, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new       
-low.aspx. 
312 See Ellis & Hicken, supra note 302; Noah, supra note 291. 
313 See Overview of BBB Rating, supra note 303. 
314 Cindy Galli & Brian Ross, Better Business Bureau Gives Itself an ‘F’ in Los 
Angeles, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/business-bureau-los  
-angeles/story?id=18706507. 
315 See Walt Disney World Company, supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
316 Mallen et al., supra note 293, at 443, 445; Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Men Posing as 
Ordinary Consumers: The Essential Role of Self-Regulation and Industry Ethics on 
Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 495–97 (2013). 
317 Levi, supra note 111, at 663–65; Mallen et al., supra note 293, at 445–46. 
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consumers.318 These organizations can, in many instances, serve as 
the frontline investigator that helps alert a governmental entity about a 
given business’s questionable activities.319 
B. Origin and Judicial Recognition of Qualified Privilege for BBB 
Entities 
Many courts across the country have recognized that BBB entities 
can invoke a qualified privilege to defamation and similar claims 
when commenting on “questionable business practices” or engaging 
in related consumer protection functions based on their historic role in 
doing so.320 The rationale for this protection is the significant benefits 
that society and consumers receive from the information BBB 
organizations provide about businesses.321 Much like the comparable 
First Amendment protections, courts have applied the privilege to 
claims beyond defamation such as interference with contractual or 
business relations, conspiracy, unfair competition, and malicious 
prosecution.322 
However, before exploring this privilege, it is important to address 
who can actually assert the privilege. While the most recognizable 
entity that would fall within the scope of this privilege is a BBB 
entity, this protection is not specifically limited to that effect.323 The 
same protection could also apply to a comparable organization.324 
The standard for identifying a comparable entity has previously been 
articulated as follows: whether the entity “is apparently nonprofit and 
dedicated to promoting truth in advertising and selling, to maintaining 
 
318 See Ponte, supra note 316, at 495–503. 
319 See id.; Mallen et al., supra note 293, at 453–54. 
320 See Haueter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 811 P.2d 231, 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); see 
Ohio State Home Servs., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Akron, Inc., 627 N.E.2d 602, 604 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
321 See Patio World v. Better Bus. Bureau, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 1098, 1102–03 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1989) (recognizing role BBB entity played in providing “[r]eliability reports on 
businesses and stores in the Miami Valley area upon request so that customers may be 
served better by ethical providers”); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander, § 301 (1995 & 
Supp. 2016) (“In some states, for public policy reasons, Better Business Bureaus have a 
qualified privilege against liability for defamation.”). 
322 See Annotation, Liability of Better Business Bureau or Similar Organization in Tort, 
50 A.L.R.4TH 745, § 2[a] (2011) [hereinafter Liability of BBB]; Castle Rock Remodeling, 
LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater St. Louis, Inc., 354 S.W.3d 234, 244–46 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2011) (explaining that privilege defeats claim for interference with a business 
expectancy). 
323 See Liability of BBB, supra note 322, § 1[a]. 
324 See id. § 1[a], n.2. 
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an impartial attitude toward firms and individuals, and to building and 
preserving public confidence in legitimate business.”325 
There are two commonly recognized origins for the qualified 
privilege on which BBB entities rely. First, simply that the privilege 
is a highly specific manifestation of the general common law 
privilege to speak freely in the interest of third parties for the general 
public good—in this case, to protect consumers.326 Second, as an 
offshoot of the privilege applicable to mercantile agencies and credit 
agencies who have a similar privilege to that of BBB entities.327 
While First Amendment precedent has shaped many aspects of 
defamation law, including case law related to this privilege, the 
qualified privilege is normally treated as a distinct protection.328 The 
First Amendment may in a given case provide certain protections that 
the qualified privilege would not and vice versa.329 
As some courts have recognized, this qualified privilege essentially 
arises from a specific application of the general privilege to speak 
freely in the interest of the public good.330 Less commonly, courts 
have endorsed the BBB privilege pursuant to the common law 
privilege that a person has a right to communicate with others to 
effectuate an interest important to the speaker (i.e., the BBB’s interest 
in bringing attention to questionable business practices).331 The 
general parameters of those two privileges in their common law form 
appear in Sections 594 and 595 of the Restatement discussed 
 
325 See id. 
326 See Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 872 A.2d 1202, 1210 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2005) (recognizing conditional privilege for BBB on bases that “[a] conditional 
privilege arises when a recognized interest of the public is involved”), aff’d 923 A.2d 389 
(Pa. 2007); Haueter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 811 P.2d 231, 240–41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
327 See infra text accompanying notes 335–341. 
328 See Trim-A-Way Figure Contouring, Ltd. v. Nat’l Better Bus. Bureau, Inc., 37 
A.D.2d 43, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). Some courts have in part relied on First 
Amendment case law as a grounds for recognizing this qualified privilege. See also Patio 
World v. Better Bus. Bureau, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 1098, 1102–03 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
329 See supra Part III. 
330 See Audition Div., Ltd. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Chi., Inc., 458 N.E.2d 115, 
120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Trim-A-Way Figure Countouring, Ltd., 37 A.D.2d at 45; Am. 
Future Sys., Inc., 872 A.2d at 1210, aff’d 923 A.2d 389; Haueter, 811 P.2d at 240–41. 
331 See Wilson v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., No. 10–412, 2013 WL 967161, at *13–14 (W.D. 
Pa. Mar. 12, 2013); Patio World, 538 N.E.2d at 1102 (relying in part on this principle); 
Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Austin, Inc., 710 
S.W.2d 190, 192–93 (Tex. App. 1986). 
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previously in this Article.332 Whatever the origin, a distinct privilege 
has effectively evolved with rules that courts apply only to the BBB 
and similar entities.333 Theoretically, any organization seeking to play 
a consumer watchdog role could seek protection under these general 
privileges outlined in the Restatement. However, they would not have 
the body of favorable case law available to a BBB entity.334 
The privilege applicable to mercantile agencies (referred to more 
commonly now as credit agencies) is another source of case law that 
helped shape the qualified privilege applicable to BBB entities.335 
Historically, mercantile agencies collect information relating to the 
credit, character, responsibility, general reputation and other matters 
affecting persons, firms, and corporations engaged in business.336 The 
mercantile agency furnishes this information to subscribers in 
exchange for some consideration so that the subscribers may procure 
information concerning the trustworthiness of others in business, 
thereby allowing the subscribers to safely and properly conduct 
business with strangers or distant customers.337 A good example of 
such an agency is the company Dun & Bradstreet, which has existed 
since 1841 and still provides services of this nature.338 This 
mercantile-agency privilege stems from the more general qualified 
privilege where the publisher and recipient have a common interest—
here, as it relates to bad credit risks and delinquent debtors.339 The 
rationale for recognizing a privilege in this context has been that these 
 
332 See supra text accompanying notes 188–195. 
333 See Ohio State Home Servs. Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Akron, Inc., 627 N.E.2d 
602, 604 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). See generally Liability of BBB, supra note 322. 
334  ELDER, supra note 188, § 2:25; Liability of BBB, supra note 322, § 1[a] and 
accompanying text. 
335 See Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Maricopa Cty., Inc., 637 P.2d 
733, 738–39 (Ariz. 1981); Patio World, 538 N.E.2d at 1102–04; Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. 
Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 397–98 (Pa. 2007) (“Finally, any privilege 
that the Bureau retained in this case was clearly analogous to a credit reporting agency’s 
‘conditional privilege to publish defamatory matter’ . . . .”); Liability of BBB, supra note 
322, § 2[a]. 
336 Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway, 126 So.2d 271, 273 (Miss. 1961) (citing 36 AM. JUR. 
Mercantile Agencies, § 2 (1936)). The same basic definition applies to a credit agency at 
least thinking historically of a credit agency versus a modern credit reporting agency 
which operates nationally and largely online. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Collection and Credit 
Agencies § 35 (1976 & Supp. 2016); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model 
Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 366 (2006) (discussing modern 
credit reporting agencies Equifax, Trans Union, and Experian). 
337 See Retail Credit, Co., 126 So.2d at 238. 
338 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985). 
339 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 544; KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
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mercantile agencies perform a useful business service for the benefit 
of those who have a legitimate interest in obtaining the information 
and who are requesting it from the association.340 Importantly, a BBB 
entity providing information on a business’s activities with consumers 
is far more likely to involve a matter of public concern under the First 
Amendment than a credit report for that same business issued by a 
mercantile agency.341 
As previously mentioned, a BBB entity has a qualified privilege it 
can invoke against a defamation or similar claim related to the BBB’s 
consumer protection functions. Generally speaking, a BBB entity 
under the qualified privilege will not be liable for false factual 
statements made in connection with its consumer protection 
functions—such as statements made in connection with rating a 
business—unless those statements were made with actual malice akin 
to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law.342 This distinction 
as to the privilege extending to statements of fact is critical because 
there are many separate protections for opinions.343 To defeat the 
privilege, the plaintiff must prove that the statement was both false 
and made with actual malice.344 A limited number of cases have 
applied a standard of negligence versus actual malice in this 
context.345 Logically, as the Restatement has recognized, if proof of 
negligence is required either by the state or for a constitutional reason, 
it would make no sense to also apply a negligence standard to the 
privilege, as the privilege would essentially have no meaning.346 
 
340 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 115. 
341 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761–62; supra text accompanying notes 
260–265 and accompanying text. 
342 See, e.g., Castle Rock Remodeling, LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater St. Louis, 
Inc., 354 S.W.3d 234, 242–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); Patio World v. Better Bus. Bureau,, 
Inc., 538 N.E.2d 1098, 1103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (relying on Supreme Court’s actual 
malice standard); Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of 
Austin, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. App. 1986); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 
316 (1995 & Supp. 2016). 
343 See Castle Rock, 354 S.W.3d at 244 (explaining this distinction and absolute 
privilege for opinions in some instances); supra text accompanying notes 140–153. 
344 See Patio World, 538 N.E.2d at 1102. 
345 See, e.g., Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 394 
(Pa. 2007) (applying negligence standard). 
346 Section 594 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts comment b states that it would be 
necessary to prove recklessness or falsity to defeat this privilege if negligence is otherwise 
required for instance for a constitutional reason. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
594 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). While the initial drafters of the Restatement in 1977 
WALTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017 8:13 PM 
232 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 185 
While expressed differently by various state courts, generally 
speaking, the BBB privilege applies when the statement is (1) on a 
subject matter in which the BBB has an interest, right, or duty; (2) 
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty 
(consumers); (3) on a proper occasion consistent with the privilege; 
and (4) in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the 
occasion and duty, right, or interest.347 
As addressed earlier in this Article, abuse of a qualified privilege 
can occur when the publication is made with actual malice or when 
the publication is made in an excessive manner in relation to the 
scope of the privilege.348 Given that the purpose of the privilege 
involves alerting the public to potentially questionable business 
practices, it would be difficult for a BBB entity to abuse the privilege 
for excessively publishing the information.349 BBB entities have, for 
extended periods of time, brought attention to businesses engaging in 
such practices which takes its modern form in webpages providing 
information about those businesses which consumers may seek out at 
their option.350 It is generally recognized that the scope of a 
defamation privilege in a given dispute fluctuates depending on the 
size of the group interested in the publication. Which means in a 
 
may have been overzealous in characterizing the Supreme Court as having definitively 
resolved the issue whether a plaintiff in all defamation disputes including those involving 
matters of private concern must prove fault such as negligence, see DOBBS ET AL., supra 
note 130, §§ 519, 557, the logic of the Restatement drafters is sound. Furthermore, the 
Restatement drafters have subsequently reaffirmed this heightened standard for defeating 
any qualified privilege. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 25, Special Note on 
Conditional Privileges and the Constitutional Requirement of Fault (AM. LAW INST. 
1977). If the state requires proof of negligence to prove defamation, any defamation 
privilege essentially would have no purpose if a showing of negligence could defeat it. See 
id. It makes more sense to require actual malice as many courts and the Restatement do 
rather than treat a privilege as “superfluous.” See Am. Future Sys., 923 A.2d at 398. 
347 Ohio State Home Servs., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Akron, Inc., 627 N.E.2d 602, 
603 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
348 See Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Maricopa Cty., Inc, 637 P.2d 
733, 738–39 (Ariz. 1981) (finding fact issue as to abuse of privilege as to actual malice); 
Moore v. Cobb-Nettleton, 889 A.2d 1262, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (outlining same 
bases for abuse of privilege); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). 
349 See, e.g., Audition Div., Ltd. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Chi., Inc., 458 N.E.2d 
115, 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“The BBB reports are issued to consumers to provide 
information.”). 
350 See Patio World v. Better Bus. Bureau, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 1098, 1102–03 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1989) (discussing how BBB entity provided “reliability reports on businesses and 
stores in the Miami Valley area upon request so that customers may be served better by 
ethical providers”); supra Part IV(A). 
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dispute involving a BBB entity that group would typically include 
consumers who may do business with a company that is unhappy 
about the BBB’s conduct.351 
A business attempting to sue a BBB entity, for instance about a 
rating or information underlying that rating, can encounter other 
significant obstacles besides the qualified privilege. For instance, 
some courts have held that the information contained in a BBB report, 
including complaint history and lawsuit history, was not defamatory 
even if it could be construed as critical of the business because the 
BBB entity was not directly or indirectly calling the plaintiff 
dishonest or stating that the plaintiff engaged in improper business 
activities.352 Importantly, a BBB entity can generally invoke the 
argument that its rating of a business is an opinion that is not 
actionable without the need to invoke the qualified privilege.353 The 
rationale for this opinion’s treatment is that (1) the rating constitutes 
the BBB’s judgment about the business based on subjective factors 
and subjective weighing of objective factors, and (2) the rating is not 
provably true or false.354 Under the Communications Decency Act, 
the BBB would have immunity from liability for hosting online 
statements of customers such as complaints and reviews about a 
business.355 
V 
LIABILITY OF CROWDSOURCED CONSUMER REVIEW SITES AND 
OTHER ENTITIES COVERED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) represents a 
dramatic federal intervention into the liability scheme governing 
republication of a third party’s statements online. Congress passed the 
act under a larger statutory enactment referred to as the 
 
351 See Audition Div., 458 N.E.2d at 119; ELDER, supra note 188, § 2:34. 
352 See Audition Div., 458 N.E.2d at 118–19. For comparison, a plaintiff who obtained 
conflicting statements from the BBB entity involved as to whether the business resolved 
complaints was able to raise a fact issue regarding abuse of the privilege, see Patio World, 
538 N.E.2d at 1103. 
353 See, e.g., Castle Rock Remodeling, LLC v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater St. Louis, 
Inc., 354 S.W.3d 234, 242–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Hous., 
Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 354, 357–58 (Tex. App. 2013). 
354 See Castle Rock, 354 S.W.3d at 242–43. 
355 See infra Part V. 
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.356 Congress recognized tort 
liability as a significant risk to those operating on the Internet, a risk 
which could hinder the natural development of the web.357 There was 
also significant concern that without some protection, content 
providers would face pressure to block offensive or controversial 
speech.358 The CDA allocates responsibility to the person who 
originally made the statement, as opposed to someone who did not 
create it.359 Congress preferred a deregulated sphere in this area to 
allow the Internet to develop its own solutions to these problems.360 
Its desire was to let websites determine what to publish and not 
publish through the traditional editorial process.361 Congress wished 
to extinguish state precedent where online platforms could find 
themselves in a position that, because they performed some editing of 
some user content, they could become liable for other content they did 
not edit.362 Additionally, Congress preferred parental choice for the 
online content that children view.363 
Section 230(c) of the Act provides the key protections relevant to 
entities publishing statements online related to business products and 
services. This CDA provision mandates that: “No provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”364 The statute provides for a corresponding protection from 
civil liability for any actions taken to restrict access to objectionable 
content or to inform users how to block objectionable content.365 
 
356 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scatted sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)). See also Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal 
Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got it Right 
and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 584 (2008). The larger purpose of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “was to reduce regulation and encourage ‘the rapid 
deployment of new telecommunications technologies.’” Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 857 (1997). 
357 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
358 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
359 See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010). 
360 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). 
361 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
362 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
363 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2); H.R. REP. NO. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 207–08. 
364 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
365 Id. § 230(c)(2). 
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These protections are sometimes referred to as the CDA’s “safe 
harbor.”366 The statutory references to publishing and speaking 
trigger protections against defamation and similar claims.367 While 
not a model of clarity in statutory drafting,368 courts consistently 
interpret the statute as providing broad liability protections.369 
Section 230 significantly departed from defamation common law 
where a person hosting another’s statement online could, under many 
circumstances, be liable for that statement.370 Prior to the CDA, 
courts would address liability in this context by evaluating whether 
the defendant was a publisher, distributor, or common carrier with 
each having their own liability standards as discussed earlier in this 
Article.371 Companies operating online under the common law faced 
an inconsistent liability scheme that could vary depending on how a 
court classified them or depending on the jurisdiction where the suit 
arose.372 
The CDA’s protections extend to statements originally published 
by a third-party “information content provider” which is statutorily 
defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”373 Any 
provider or user of an interactive computer service can invoke these 
protections.374 While the protection when it comes into play is broad, 
 
366 See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 2009). 
367 H.R. REP. NO.104–458, at 194 (“One of the specific purposes of this section is to 
overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated 
such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because 
they have restricted access to objectionable material.”). See also Michal Lavi, Content 
Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 868–69 (2016). 
368 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–61 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing how Section 
230(c)’s language could arguably be read not to provide any liability protection). 
369 Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254–55 (4th Cir. 
2009) (“To further the policies underlying the CDA, courts have generally accorded § 230 
immunity a broad scope.”). 
370 See Ehrlich, supra note 160; Ziniti, supra note 356, at 584–85. 
371 See Ehrlich, supra note 160, at 403; supra text accompanying notes 160–162. 
372 David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 147, 153–58 (1997). 
373 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
374 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 
1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003). 
WALTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017 8:13 PM 
236 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 185 
the CDA “only protects from liability (1) a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under 
a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of 
information provided by another information content provider.”375 
Most commonly, a website will be the interactive computer service 
involved.376 However, many different digital interfaces can qualify as 
an interactive computer service, for instance: (1) a consumer review 
page on a Yelp webpage,377 (2) an online newsletter,378 (3) an 
electronic listserv where users communicate with one another,379 (4) 
an internet search engine,380 and (5) a social networking website.381 
At least one court has improperly read the statute as providing 
immunity only to companies that provide actual access to the Internet 
such as America Online.382 As various courts have recognized, 
because the contours of technological categories are not always clear, 
overly rigid approaches that determine CDA immunity based on a 
technology’s classification into one of those categories could cause 
many problems.383 
Because of CDA restrictions, a defendant protected under the CDA 
has no obligation to filter or censor information hosted on an 
 
375 Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
376 See id. (quoting Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162 n.6) (“[T]oday, the most common 
interactive computer services are websites.”). 
377 See, e.g., id. (first quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2); then quoting Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“Yelp is plainly a provider 
of an ‘interactive computer service,’ a term that we interpret ‘expansive[ly]’ under the 
CDA.” (alteration in original)). 
378 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31 (“There is no dispute that the Network uses 
interactive computer services to distribute its on-line mailing and to post the listserv on its 
website. Indeed, to make its website available and to mail out the listserv, the Network 
must access the Internet through some form of ‘interactive computer service.’”) (emphasis 
in original). 
379 See id. at 1030–31. 
380 Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 543, 545–47 (E.D. 
Va. 2015). 
381 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
382 880-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 295 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(narrowly reading the definition of information content provider only to those who 
“provide access to the Internet like service providers such as AOL”). Many courts have 
specifically rejected such a limited definition. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030. 
383 See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1037 n.3 (Gould, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“CDA immunity should depend not on how a defendant’s technology is 
classified, but on the defendant’s conduct.”). 
WALTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2017 8:13 PM 
2017] When Can You Shoot the Messenger? Understanding the 237 
Legal Protections for Entities Providing Information on Business Products and 
Services in the Digital Age 
interactive computer service that comes from third parties.384 A 
plaintiff can still pursue claims against the person originally making 
the statement but cannot go after the content provider hosting the 
statement.385 Even if the third party’s statement reveals an intent to 
engage in unlawful activity, a defendant covered by the CDA is not 
liable for the statement.386 
However, there are limits to what a defendant covered by the CDA 
can do with information posted by another content provider and still 
benefit from the CDA’s liability protections. For example, a 
defendant can become responsible under Section 230(f)(3) for 
development of content “if it in some way specifically encouraged 
development of what is offensive about the content.”387 This 
limitation on coverage can be problematic for a website if not 
appropriately considered and can arise whenever the user is inputting 
information at the request of the website—such as personal 
information to register on a website or for the user to post material.388 
Likewise, more than one person may be responsible for the original 
content if that person contributes “in whole or in part” to the 
content.389 Those the CDA would otherwise protect remain liable for 
their own speech, although notice of the unlawful nature of 
 
384 Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the CDA 
protections “bar[] ‘lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone, or alter content’”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 
980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). 
385 See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The majority of federal circuits have interpreted 
the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’” 
(quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)); supra Part II. 
386 See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 669–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (“But given § 230(c)(1) it cannot sue the messenger just 
because the message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”). 
387 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); see 
also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1165 (9th Cir. 2008). 
388 Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (discussing this issue in the context of claimed 
discrimination violations of the Fair Housing Act and California law). 
389 Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under the 
statutory scheme, an ‘interactive computer service’ qualifies for immunity so long as it 
does not also function as an ‘information content provider’ for the portion of the statement 
or publication at issue.”). 
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information provided by another is not enough to transform the 
speech into the provider’s own speech.390 These rules are a significant 
break from the common law where publication can include negligent 
communication of a defamatory statement or failure to remove a 
statement.391 
Any online website such as Amazon or Yelp which allows 
customers to post reviews about business products and/or services 
would also fall into this same category of protected defendants.392 
While there appear to be no published cases that have dealt with this 
specific scenario, the same principle would apply to a BBB entity’s 
activity of hosting consumer complaints online.393 Social media and 
other crowdsourced platforms are one of the best examples of how the 
line has blurred between content providers and content consumers.394 
As Congress’s policy goals underlying the CDA reflect, such 
platforms are unique resources that our society should foster by 
modifying the common law defamation rules.395 These platforms that 
simply host content from others function only as facilitators for that 
content because the website is not creating it.396 The CDA does not, 
however, protect these entities from content they themselves 
create.397 
 
390 Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 419–20. 
391 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Publication does not 
only describe the choice by an author to include certain information. In addition, both the 
negligent communication of a defamatory statement and the failure to remove such a 
statement when first communicated by another party—each alleged by Zeran here under a 
negligence label—constitute publication.”). 
392 Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Yelp is plainly a 
provider of an ‘interactive computer service,’ a term that we interpret ‘expansive[ly]’ 
under the CDA.” (citations omitted)); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 41 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“Under the plain language of the statute, Amazon is a provider of 
interactive computer services for purposes of § 230(f)(2).”). 
393 See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268; Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 
591 F.3d 250, 252, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying CDA immunity to “website that 
allows consumers to comment on the quality of businesses, goods, and services”); 
Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41. 
394 See SIMPSON, supra note 24, at 1; supra Part IV (discussing BBB complaint 
process). 
395 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (2012). 
396 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008). 
397 See id. 
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Importantly, the CDA preempts state law that is contrary to Section 
230.398 This preemptive effect applies not to just defamation claims, 
but also to any claim seeking to hold a person covered by the act 
responsible for publishing a third party’s statement.399 What matters 
is not the name of the cause of action but rather whether it would 
inherently require the court to treat the defendant as the publisher or 
speaker of content provided by another.400 Courts have recognized 
that CDA preemption can bar numerous claims beyond typical 
defamation claims, including: (1) a negligence claim related to 
publishing third-party content,401 (2) a statutory claim under state law 
for deceptive trade practices seeking to hold a provider liable for 
refusing to remove third-party content,402 (3) common law 
misrepresentation claims such as fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation,403 (4) false light claims,404 and (5) assault.405 As a 
general principle, it is logical that CDA preemption should extend at 
least to any cause of action besides defamation that First Amendment 
protections or common law privilege would also defeat. 
Many plaintiffs have sought creative ways to circumvent the CDA, 
although courts have generally applied the CDA’s protections 
broadly. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an attempt to hold 
Google responsible for bloggers’ statements based on allegations 
“that Google manipulated its search results to prominently feature the 
article at issue.”406 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit did not treat minor 
alterations to an email by an online newsletter before the newsletter 
re-posted the email as sufficient development to trigger liability.407 
 
398 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may 
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”); Almeida 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006). 
399 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
“section 230(c)(1) precludes courts from treating internet service providers as publishers 
not just for the purposes of defamation law . . . .”). 
400 See Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
App. Div. 2010) (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102). 
401 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102–03, 1105–06. 
402 Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Opinion Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 
2015). 
403 Milgram, 16 A.3d at 1121. 
404 See id. 
405 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
406 Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 F. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). 
407 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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One plaintiff was able to get around the CDA by asserting a 
promissory estoppel claim on a theory that the website had promised 
the plaintiff that it would remove certain content.408 
VI 
THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF SPEECH PROTECTIONS FOR 
ENTITIES COMMENTING ON BUSINESS PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 
While the legal system is still grappling with the implications of 
the shift to digital platforms in the defamation arena and countless 
other areas of law, society has already embraced these platforms to 
consume a wide variety of media and non-media content. For the 
legal system to treat the content on these platforms in a more hostile 
way than the content on non-digital platforms is shortsighted and 
improperly preferential to traditional media. In fact, nontraditional 
media entities such as Facebook and Google, with their extensive 
digital presence, can positively influence public discourse in a way 
traditional media entities cannot. One downside to digital platforms is 
that they have allowed people with commercial or political motives to 
massively circulate fake news at virtually no cost, especially through 
social media.409 To counter such trends, Facebook has taken various 
measures to strengthen quality control, such as enlisting its user base 
to report fake news and implementing digital countermeasures to 
detect fake news.410 Google has similarly modified its search 
algorithms to filter out sites known for generating fake news.411 
Traditional media organizations, in comparison, can only report on 
the fake news rather than limit how much it spreads. 
There is an increasingly weak rationale for drawing distinctions 
based on media status. The Supreme Court has taken many steps to 
(1) emphasize that non-media defendants are entitled to the same 
 
408 Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1106–09 (9th Cir. 2009). 
409 James Carson, What Is Fake News? Its Origins and How it Grew in 2016, 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 16, 2017, 1:57 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake       
-news-origins-grew-2016/. 
410 Seth Fiegerman, Facebook’s Global Fight Against Fake News, CNN MONEY (May 
9, 2017, 10:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/09/technology/facebook-fake-news 
/index.html; Ashley May, How Facebook Plans to Crack Down on Fake News, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 20, 2016, 9:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/11/19/how   
-facebook-plans-crack-down-fake-news/94123842/. 
411 James Titcomb, Google Overhauls Search Algorithm in Bid to Fight Fake News, 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 25, 2017, 3:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/04/25 
/google-overhauls-search-algorithm-bid-fight-fake-news/. 
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protection as media defendants,412 and (2) protect content unique to 
digital platforms to the full extent allowed under the First 
Amendment.413 Nevertheless, many courts have expressed a 
reluctance to extend First Amendment protections to non-media 
defendants.414 This situation puts courts in the role of deciding who is 
a media defendant when that question has never been more 
complex.415 Judges are humans too, and it is sometimes human nature 
to treat with hostility new technologies and evolving definitions of 
familiar concepts, such as the definition of media. 
To the extent the Supreme Court has not already resolved this 
issue, extending these protections to non-media defendants is, in 
many ways, less controversial than the Supreme Court modifying 
defamation rules in the first place. Many changes to the common law 
are controversial when they first occur,416 but the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed and expanded the First Amendment protections in the 
defamation arena over time because it has routinely recognized how 
important free speech is to our society.417 Congress similarly did not 
adopt media and non-media distinctions under the CDA, treating 
those who simply host the statements of third parties as non-
culpable.418 
 
412 See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
413 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
414 See supra text accompanying notes 268–281; see, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1, at 
180–84; supra note 281 and accompanying text; Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 446 
(Iowa 2013) (rejecting protection for non-media defendant); Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 
141, 152–53 (Wis. 1982) (same); see also Fleming v. Moore, 275 S.E.2d 632, 638, n.11 
(Va. 1981) (“Lower courts are divided on whether the First Amendment protections 
provided media defendants in New York Times and Gertz are applicable to non-media 
defendants.”). 
415 See supra Part I; Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009). 
416 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 3. Many states continue to draw distinctions 
with non-media defendants. See supra text accompanying notes 136, 268, 281. 
417 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“The First Amendment 
reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). That is because “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–
75 (1964)). 
418 See supra Part V. 
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As has occurred in numerous legal fields, including tort law,419 the 
Supreme Court and legislatures have charged courts with enforcing 
these limitations by narrowing what cases can proceed to trial.420 We 
have many available options to strongly enforce these First 
Amendment, common law, and statutory protections against 
defamation and related claims. In particular, a simple solution is to 
meaningfully enforce the various procedural devices through which 
we screen claims including: (1) motions to dismiss,421 (2) motions for 
summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter of law,422 
and (3) appeals.423 More states could adopt generally applicable anti-
SLAAP statutes that protect, through expedited motions to dismiss, 
any defendant exercising their free speech rights.424 Texas, for 
instance, has adopted a creative approach that permits interlocutory 
appeal of denial of an anti-SLAAP motion.425 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, placing judges in the 
position to screen these claims “lessen[s] the possibility that a jury 
will use the cloak of a general verdict to punish unpopular ideas or 
speakers.”426 The Court, for instance, has emphasized the need for 
independent appellate review of many constitutional issues in the 
First Amendment area, including the existence of actual malice.427 It 
is fully appropriate, in the early phases of a case, to apply meaningful 
burdens as well on motions to dismiss and motions for summary 
 
419 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 1 (“Judges may minimize or eliminate the jury’s 
role in a different way by making a rule of law that demands a precise result or that casts 
the judge in the role of decision maker.”). 
420 See supra Parts IV, VI. 
421 See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 227 n.12 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing 
appropriateness of applying CDA dismissal at motion to dismiss stage); DOBBS ET AL., 
supra note 130, § 573 (discussing motion to dismiss options in enforcing defamation 
protections and appropriate pleading of defamation elements). 
422 See generally Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu de P.R., Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 
233 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment originally granted on both First 
Amendment grounds and other grounds in case involving vehicle performance article 
authored by Consumers Union); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 573 (addressing 
summary judgment protections against defamation claim). 
423 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011) (setting aside jury verdict). 
424 See Barylak, supra note 14, at 869–72; Hartzler, supra note 14, at 1237–38, 1252–
70. 
425 See Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Hous., Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 
S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex. App. 2013). 
426 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 n.15 (1966). 
427 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498–500 (1984); Lee 
Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 
AM. U.L. REV. 3, 47–50 (1985). 
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judgment.428 As to common law causes of actions, courts can further 
hold plaintiffs to their burden of pleading adequate claims and raising 
a genuine issue of material fact on matters that can be difficult to 
prove such as: (1) presenting evidence that a statement was false, (2) 
presenting evidence of actual malice, and (3) showing a privilege was 
abused. 
Many applicable protections for a defendant commenting on a 
business’s products or services are questions of law for a court. These 
include whether any statements at issue are opinions,429 whether 
those opinions are actionable,430 whether a qualified privilege 
applies,431 and whether the speech relates to a matter of public 
concern.432 Importantly, under the First Amendment, the ultimate 
issue of whether speech is protected is often treated as a question of 
law.433 Furthermore, courts have had no difficulty meaningfully 
enforcing the CDA immunity procedurally through legal 
determinations, particularly given the broad scope of the statute.434 
Courts are in the best position to strike a meaningful balance between 
these protections and a plaintiff’s rights. 
We cannot allow technological innovations to undermine the 
principles underlying these protections or the judicial system’s 
willingness to enforce them. These protections involve many 
conflicting concerns including potential serious injury to people’s 
reputations and perceived unfair treatment from the media. These 
competing values sometimes cause us to lose sight of why these 
protective principles exist in the first place. Those who do not like the 
impacts of these protections understandably seek to challenge or 
overturn them. For instance, President Donald Trump has reportedly 
discussed with former FBI Director James Comey prosecuting 
journalists for leaking classified information under federal espionage 
 
428 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 573; Levine, supra note 427, at 68–77. 
429 See, e.g., Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 
1285 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987). 
430 See, e.g., id.; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17–22; Slawik v. News-
Journal Co., 428 A.2d 15, 17 (Del. 1981) (treating determination of actionability of 
opinions under state law as question of law). 
431 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
432 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–86 (1987); D’Angelo v. Sch. Bd. of 
Polk Cty., Fla., 497 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007). 
433 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386 n.9. 
434 See supra Part V. 
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statutes.435 While President Trump is not the first president to flirt 
with the idea of prosecuting journalists, critics point out that his 
efforts are extreme compared to his recent predecessors.436 
Likewise, President Trump pledged to soften existing defamation 
protections during his campaign.437 Any erosion of defamation 
protections would potentially apply to all defamation defendants, 
whether media or non-media. He will have appointed by the end of 
his presidency at least one, and potentially several, Supreme Court 
justices.438 While hopefully these appointees will not weaken existing 
restrictions, this risk is not a theoretical one. Fortunately, there has 
been strong bipartisan support on the Court in the twenty-first century 
for not only upholding prior First Amendment precedent in this area 
but actually expanding it.439 
Similar to the principles underlying the qualified immunity that 
government officials can invoke against claims for constitutional 
violations,440 we grant additional protections to defamation 
defendants when they are advancing interests important to our 
society. While not as expansive as the protections underlying 
qualified immunity, a key goal of the safeguards for defamation 
defendants speaking on protected matters is to reduce the litigation 
they must face—the financial cost of which could suppress that 
speech.441 It is important as ever to afford these protections to 
traditional media institutions whose continued existence we cannot 
take for granted with the increasing challenges to their profitability 
from the digital revolution.442 Litigation is even more costly for a 
 
435 Chris Cillizza, The Time Donald Trump Reportedly Urged James Comey to Jail 
Journalists, CNN (updated May 17, 2017, 11:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/17 
/politics/comey-memo-press-jailed-trump/index.html. 
436 See id. For detailed coverage on First Amendment protections to criminal 
prosecution for leaking classified information, see generally Derigan A. Silver, National 
Security and the Press: The Government’s Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the 
Possession or Publication of National Security Information, 13 COMM. L. &POL’Y 447 
(2008). 
437 Ben Jacobs, Donald Trump Pledges to Curb Press Freedom Through Libel Laws, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2016, 3:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/26 
/trump-pledges-curb-press-freedom-libel-laws-first-amendment. 
438 Adam Liptak, What the Trump Presidency Means for the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-supreme    
-court.html?_r=0. 
439 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447–59 (2011); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–92, 799 (2011). 
440 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
441 See Levine, supra note 427, at 90–91. 
442 See supra Part I. 
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business without many financial resources, such as a nontraditional 
media organization trying to make a name for itself.443 
The law frequently recognizes that conduct, even if some might 
consider it faulty, does not warrant any liability.444 It is in many ways 
an overarching principle in tort law that if behavior is socially 
reasonable, we should not punish the person engaging in that 
conduct.445 The Supreme Court has expressed a strong tolerance 
under the First Amendment of accepting the problematic 
consequences that come with free speech because the alternative is far 
worse.446 If it means speech will otherwise face suppression, courts 
have recognized that society must tolerate everything from bruised 
egos to even serious injury to reputation with dramatic economic 
consequences.447 For some problems like maintaining a free sphere 
for speech, the Supreme Court has found that it is simply better to let 
society address the problem rather than the litigation system.448 It is a 
foundational principle of tort law that the legal system cannot solve 
all problems because of its inherent limitations.449 
Meaningfully enforcing these protections, and even expanding 
them, will not have any dramatic negative consequences that our legal 
system has not already taken into account. Many defamation disputes 
simply will not implicate these common law and constitutional 
protections, including those applicable to comments on business 
products and services, which limits abuse of these protections.450 
Likewise, the threat of a jury trial is still a significant motivating 
factor which traditional media institutions and others face if they are 
 
443 See Levine, supra note 427, at 90–91. 
444 See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, §§ 2, 11 (“Sometimes this occurs when 
courts seem to define fault to include rather ordinary conduct. At other times, even faulty 
behavior does not result in liability.”). 
445 KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 1 (“So far as there is one central idea, it would 
seem that it is that liability must be based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable.”). 
446 See supra Part III. 
447 See supra Part III; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 3. 
448 See supra Part III. 
449 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 130, § 19 (“Law cannot effectively solve all 
problems. Even issues capable of legal resolution are sometimes resolved outside the law 
by community standards and practices that do not depend heavily upon formal tort law.”). 
450 See, e.g., id. § 3. 
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not careful with how they act.451 In spite of strong protections that are 
already in place, the threat of multimillion dollar lawsuits for 
criticizing powerful businesses, highly affluent individuals, or 
prominent politicians serves as a real deterrent for media and non-
media entities, particularly smaller ones.452 For those claims that 
proceed forward to a jury, a defamation defendant must worry about 
exposure not only to compensatory but punitive damages.453 Media 
organizations who want to succeed in the marketplace must also pay 
attention to the accuracy of their reporting which serves as a self-
motivated check on what they publish.454 
CONCLUSION 
The Federalist Papers prophetically recognized in discussing the 
importance of freedom of the press: “What is the liberty of the press? 
. . . [W]hatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution 
respecting it, it must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the 
general spirit of the people and the government.”455 Rising to this 
challenge, our legal system has embraced a broad definition of 
freedom of speech and press because an informed public is one of the 
greatest assets a democracy can have. It is crucial that we maintain a 
protective stance towards free criticism of the key components of our 
society—including the businesses with whom we interact as 
individuals and business consumers. Consumers now have more 
information at their disposal about business practices, products, and 
services than they ever have at any point in history. This wealth of 
information helps our economy operate more efficiently and allows 
consumers to make more educated decisions about with whom they 
do business. 
 
451 See, e.g., id. § 9; Ben Sisario et al., Rolling Stone Loses Defamation Case over Rape 
Story, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/05/business/media 
/rolling-stone-rape-story-case-guilty.html?_r=0. 
452 See, e.g., Timothy O’Brien, The Lawsuits of Donald Trump, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/the-lawsuits-of-donald-trump 
/273819/ (discussing several multi-million and some multibillion dollar defamation 
disputes pursued by Donald Trump). 
453 See Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 532 n.2 (10th Cir. 
1987) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 116A) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 621, 622, 622A, 623 (AM LAW. INST. 1977)). 
454 See Jeff Storey, Note, Does Ethics Make Good Law? A Case Study, 19 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467, 489 (2001). 
455 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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We sometimes in the United States fear change will chip away at 
values that are important to us. But we cannot forget that the 
principles of intelligent journalism and the critical thinking it 
provokes are a fundamental part of our political system.456 Simply 
because a new medium presents itself does not mean we must fear it 
as a threat.457 Even in the face of resistance to technological change, 
society ultimately moves forward by embracing new technologies 
rather than clinging to the past.458 Additionally, businesses that 
succeed after major technological disruptions most often do so by 
adapting to as opposed to resisting the technology.459 
Disruption from new technology and resulting changes to 
consumer preferences have triggered dramatic transformation in many 
industries before.460 For instance, the USA Today adapted to a market 
opportunity by becoming the first truly national newspaper when it 
recognized that many readers want an expedited summary of 
important national issues.461 Quality journalism has survived in spite 
of dramatic changes journalism has faced since the 1900s.462 In spite 
of the massive use of digital options for news, such as social media, 
consumers still prefer stories from traditional media organizations.463 
Newspapers with higher perceived credibility in their respective 
market have also fared better than their counterparts.464 News 
organizations that adapt to the advantages of digital platforms will 
remain competitive on this still evolving frontier for journalism.465 
There is a risk that the ease of access to publication online will drown 
out quality journalism, but as with any major technological innovation 
there is no way to stop these changes.466 We are better off making the 
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best of this digital world as opposed to living in a past that will never 
return. 
 
